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I. Abstract  
 
The United Kingdom’s (UK) main energy source is gas, which is either imported from 
continental Europe and Norway, or shipped, in the form of liquefied natural gas from around 
the world. Given the size of the population in the UK and the declining North Sea gas 
reserves, it is highly dependent on imports of gas and the crucial political issue is to safeguard 
the supply of gas. The importance of guaranteeing the supply of gas justifies some degree of 
legal regulation to organize activities among actors involved in the gas market. Thus, the UK 
as a current Member State in the European Union (EU) adopts energy legislation, in 
accordance with the energy legislation adopted by the EU. However, with the UK 
withdrawing its membership in the EU by invoking Article 50 of the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU), energy legislation deriving from the EU will no longer be applicable in the UK. 
No country has ever invoked Article 50 TEU and despite the complexity of a withdrawal from 
the EU, little is actually known about the process.  
 
The Brexit threatens the security of the UK’s gas supply, as the current legal framework 
governing gas security in the UK, which follows the European Internal Energy Market (IEM), 
will be terminated upon withdrawal. Existing options post-Brexit available to the UK for it to 
safeguard its supply of gas range between two extremes: continued access to the IEM and 
adoption of regulations thereto (‘soft Brexit’) on the one hand, and no further preferential 
relationship with the EU (‘hard Brexit’), on the other hand. Between these two extremes there 
are a range of different options allowing for closer cooperation with the EU than the ‘hard 
Brexit’ provides (‘grey’ Brexit). In this thesis I will identify existing options available to the 
UK to secure its supply of gas, as well as study and compare the legal aspects of these 
options.  
 
To assess potential outcomes for the UK within gas security post-Brexit the international 
energy market and legislation thereto will be examined. With this approach bilateral- and 
multilateral trade and energy agreements possible to negotiate and/or to commit to with third 
countries will be studied, as to examine the option where the UK does not negotiate a 
withdrawal agreement addressing gas security matters with the EU. Another discussion will 
be the UK’s possibility to become self-sufficient in its gas supplies, taking into account 
undiscovered sources and unconventional production of gas, allowing for the UK to be less 
dependent on imports of gas. For a future relationship with the EU, existing agreements 
between third countries, on the one hand, and the EU and its Member States, on the other 
hand will be examined. This study will be executed by identifying the EU’s bilateral and 
multilateral external energy policy.  
 
This thesis is one of the first written comparative studies of potential options for a Member 
State in the EU post-withdrawal. It addresses a question, which is currently being reviewed by 
the UK Government with many specialists trying to identify post-Brexit relations. A lot of 
writing upon this subject has been done in newspapers suggesting many post-Brexit relations 
based on the political climate and gut feelings, however this research provides the theoretical 
and the law aspects of what is actually possible for the UK within gas security post-Brexit.   
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II. Abbreviations  
 
ACER  Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
APERC  Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre  
Brexit  Britain’s exit  
CET Common External-Tariff 
CETA  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement   
CS  Contracting States of the Energy Community  
ECT  International Energy Charter Treaty  
EEA  European Economic Area  
EFTA  European Free Trade Association  
ENTSOG European Network for Transmission System Operators for Gas 
EU  European Union  
EUCU European Union Customs Union 
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
GATS  General Agreement on Trade and Services  
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IEM  Internal Energy Market  
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
MFN  Most Favoured Nation principle  
SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
SPA  Strategic Partnership Agreement  
TEU  Treaty on the European Union  
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
UK  United Kingdom  
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
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1. Introduction and Problem Statement 
1.1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) is currently a member of the European Union (EU) but, as a result 
of a referendum held in June 2016, it intends to withdraw its membership. This separation 
process is commonly referred to as Brexit, merging the words Britain and exit. The new Prime 
Minister of the UK, Theresa May, was against leaving the EU but intends to respect the will 
of the people.1 One of the main reasons for the Brexit vote is thought to be the restriction on 
the free movement of persons into the UK, especially the free movement for labour,2 which is 
a freedom stipulated under Article 3(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)3, Article 
21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)4 and Article 45 of the 
TFEU. Such freedom of movement is one of the key principles of the European internal 
market, and a tenant that was rejected by the British people. However, if the UK wishes to 
have access to the free market, then it needs to weigh its options regarding the concomitant 
requirement for the free movement of persons. Furthermore, whether EU law can override 
UK law is also a major reason for Brexit and ‘Euro sceptics’ has been campaigning for an 
independent sovereign UK for a long time.5 
 
The legal consequence for the UK to withdraw from the EU is the end of the application of 
the EU Treaties, and the Protocols thereto. The application ends when a withdrawal 
agreement between the UK and the EU has been negotiated, or within two years of the UK’s 
withdrawal notification to the EU.6 EU law can therefore cease to apply in the UK, as national 
acts adopted in the implementation or transposition of EU law would remain valid until the 
national authorities decide to amend or repeal them.7 
 
The right for a Member State to leave the EU was first introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon 
under Article 50 of the TEU. This provision does not constitute any substantive conditions for 
a Member State to exercise its right to withdraw from the EU; rather it includes only 																																																								
1 Wheeler, Brian and Hunt, Alex. Brexit: All You Need to Know About the UK Leaving the EU. BBC News. 
2016-09-01 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32810887> (Retrieved 2016-09-09) and 
Chu, Ben. Why did People Really Vote for Brexit? If we don’t face the psychological reasons, we’ll never bring 
Britain together. Independent. 2016-06-26 <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-eureferendum-why-did-
people-vote-leave-immigration-nhs-a7104071.html> (Retrieved 2016-09-09). 
2 Eight Reasons Leave Won the UK’s referendum. BBC News. 2016-06-24 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-eu-referendum-36574526> (Retrieved 2016-09-09). 
3 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union of the 26 October 2012, OJ C 326.  
4 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of the 26 October 2012, OJ C 
326.  
5 Mason, Rowena. How Did UK End Up Voting to Leave the European Union? The Guardian. 2016-06-24 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/how-did-uk-end-up-voting-leave-european-union> 
(Retrieved 2016-10-26) 
6 Nicolaides, Phedon. Withdrawal from the European Union: A Typology of Effects. Maastricht Journal, Vol. 20 
(2013): p. 213 and EUR-Lex. Access to European Union Law. Withdrawal Clause <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/withdrawal_clause.html> (Retrieved 2016-09-26). 
7 Poptcheva, Eva-Maria. Article 50: Withdrawal of a Member State from the EU. European Parliamentary 
Research Service, The European Parliament (2016): p.1. 
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procedural provisions.8 This Article refers to a negotiated, post-exit relationship between the 
state of concern and the EU.9 In accordance with Article 50 TEU such an agreement needs to 
be concluded within two years from the withdrawal request, unless the European Council and 
the Member State decides jointly to extend this period. A failure for the UK to negotiate a 
withdrawal agreement with the EU would result in the so-called ‘hard Brexit’, implying no 
further preferential relationship with the EU. However this could also be a deliberate choice 
made by the UK’s politicians. Opposed to the ‘hard Brexit’, is the ‘soft Brexit’, an outcome 
with a continued relationship at somewhat the current level between the parties, but without 
the UK being referred to as a Member State of the EU. However, between these two extremes 
there is also a grey zone, referred to as the ‘grey Brexit’, in which the UK would continue 
having a preferential relation with the EU but not to the same extent as today.10 
 
The process of withdrawing from the EU is complex, and has large implications for the 
countries involved, both within the economical as well as the political context of their 
relations.11 Since the UK will be the first state in history to invoke Article 50 of the TEU, 
there exists little knowledge about such a process.12 Additionally, the UK has been a member 
of the EU since 1973, and European legislation is deeply interwoven in the UK’s legal 
framework and society. The upcoming negotiations are therefore expected to be difficult and 
complex.13  
 
1.1.1. The Internal Energy Market  
One of the central functions of the EU is to provide its Member States with an internal market 
in which all factors of production can flow freely without hindrance and where people can 
reside beyond state borders without obstacles.14 With the creation of the so-called internal 
market it was expected that cooperation between countries were to be strengthened, as 
countries that share economic interests are less likely to engage in political and social 
conflicts, which had been going on for almost five centuries on the European continent.15 																																																								
8 Ibid, p. 3-4.  
9 Nicolaides, Phedon. Withdrawal from the European Union: A Typology of Effects. Maastricht Journal, Vol. 
20 (2013): p. 209-210.   
10 Menon, Anand and Fowler, Brigid. Hard or Soft? The Politics of Brexit. National Institute Economic Review. 
Vol. 1, no. 238 (2016): p. R4-R12. 
11 This argument has mainly been presented by politicians and economists in the following sources: The Global 
Counsel. Brexit: the Impact on the UK and the EU. 2015 <https://www.global-
counsel.co.uk/sites/default/files/special-reports/downloads/Global%20Counsel_Impact_of_Brexit.pdf> 
(Retrieved 2016-09-13) and Capital Economics of Woodford Investment Management. The Economic Impact of 
Brexit. 2016 <https://woodfordfunds.com/economic-impact-brexit-report/> (Retrieved 2016-09-13) and Vivid 
Economics. The Impact of Brexit on the UK Energy Sector: An Assessment of the Risks and Opportunities for 
Electricity and Gas in the UK. 2016 <http://www.vivideconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/VE-note-
on-impact-of-Brexit-on-the-UK-energy-system.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-09-13). 
12 Lazowski, Adam. How to Withdraw from the European Union? Confronting hard reality. European Law 
Review (2013): p. 2.  
13 Foster, Nigel. EU Law. 2 ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 33-36. 
14 Barnard, Catherine. The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms, 4 ed. Oxford University Press, 
2013, p. 8-13. 
15 Hartley, Trevor C. European Union Law in a Global Context. Cambridge: University Press. 2004. p. 9-11. 
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Since a stable and integrated market was formed, business companies could focus in 
specialised production, which prompted economical advantages. Arguably, this creates a 
competitive advantage not only for consumers and producers in the internal market, but for 
the EU as a whole. This resulted in competitive advantages towards strong countries like the 
US and the former Soviet Union.16  
 
Not only has an internal market been created under Article 26 (2) of the TFEU for the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and persons, but also for the energy sector. Energy is 
one of the key questions in the EU’s agenda, as the access to energy is absolutely critical for 
both a state’s economical growth, as well as for the society to function in whole. As a result, 
the Internal Energy Market (IEM) was established to create an integrated and stable market of 
energy.17 The IEM’s main objective is to enhance competition and exploit economies of scale 
by creating an integrated regional market linked to the EU, which transcends the EU’s 
external border. Furthermore, it enhances the security of energy supply for its participating 
states, where the constant flow of the domestic demanded energy in the participating states is 
secured by the regional cooperation in the IEM.18 
 
1.1.2. Exiting the Internal Energy Market  
As a current Member State in the EU, the UK participates in the IEM. Applying the ‘hard’ or 
the ‘soft’ Brexit scenario to the UK’s current participation in the IEM, gives a ‘hard Brexit’ 
option where the UK has no preferential access to the IEM and the regulations thereto post-
withdrawal, while the ‘soft Brexit’ gives continued access to the IEM and the application of 
the regulations thereto post-withdrawal. Between these extremes, referred to as the ‘grey 
Brexit’, there are a variety of different options allowing for a continued relation with the EU 
in various different areas currently governed by EU law. Although many different options are 
available there will be pressure on the UK Government to find optimal solutions that will 
fulfil the wishes of the people, whilst preserving business and economic integrity as far as 
possible for the secure supply of energy. For example, the opinion of the UK’s residents, and 
the reason for them voting out of the EU, will be of great significance when the UK negotiates 
future economic terms and relationships with the EU. However, whether a ‘hard’, ‘soft’ or 
‘grey’ Brexit is preferred post-withdrawal is not only dependent on the wishes of the pro-
Brexit camp, but also on whether the UK is dependent on cooperation with the EU upon 
energy security. 
																																																								
16 Foster, Nigel. EU Law. 2 ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 246. 
17 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council the 28 of May 2014. 
European Energy Security Strategy, COM (2014) 330 Final.  
18 Wilson, Alex. Energy Community – Prospects and Challenges. European Parliamentary Research Service, 
The European Parliament (2015): p. 2.  
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Currently the UK is highly dependent on 
its participation in the IEM for its supply 
of energy, and in particular the supply of 
gas,20 as gas is the main energy source in 
the UK. The UK imports approximately 
60% of its gas from continental Europe 
and Norway through pipelines, or from 
the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
market.21 This thesis therefore examines 
the legal framework regarding the 
options post-Brexit in order to secure the 
supply of gas,22 such that the UK can 
continue having gas as its prime energy 
source for electricity and heating. 
 
1.1.3. Post-Withdrawal Options 
Invoking Article 50 of the TEU allows for two different outcomes post-Brexit, namely: (i) the 
UK negotiates an agreement with the EU allowing for a continued cooperation upon the 
secure supply of gas (‘soft’ and ‘grey’ Brexit), or (ii) the UK does not negotiate such an 
agreement (‘hard’ Brexit). These two outcomes can be studied from different perspectives, 
such as policy security, economics or law, and this thesis will take the latter perspective. 
Therefore, existing legal frameworks and constellations will be studied and the legal aspects 
of energy security will be compared. As for outcome (i), there is a range of existing state 
cooperation and international agreements which the UK could possibly follow, such as 
models adopted by the wider family of European countries with extensive cooperation with 
the EU (e.g. Norway, Switzerland and Albania) or looser agreements with the EU (e.g. Turkey 
and Canada). Different options are also available for outcome (ii), as the UK could make 
bilateral agreements with other parties than the EU, apply to multilateral trade and energy 
frameworks, such as those provided by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), or to make no 
agreement at all in the case of being self-sufficient in its gas supply.  
 
The nature of this topic leaves future events uncertain and it is important to note that due to 
the fast-changing and uncertain nature of this topic, this study is current up to the 23rd of 
December 2016. The impact of Brexit is difficult to predict and there is no precedent for such 																																																								
19 UK Government, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. Energy Consumption in the UK. 
2016. Chart: 1.04 [online] 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/541163/ECUK_2016.pdf> 
(Retrieve 2016-11-29).  
20 Referred to as gas, natural gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG).  
21 UK Energy. Gas Supplies. 2015 <http://www.energy-uk.org.uk/energy-industry/gas-generation/gas-
supplies.html> (Retrieved 2016-11-25). 
22 Energy security regards the secure supply of energy sources defined in chapter two. The following terms 
focusing on gas are used interchangeably throughout the thesis: safeguard the secure supply of gas, safeguard 
the supply of gas, secure the supply of gas, security of gas supply, gas supply security and gas security. 
 
© UK Government 
Figure 1. Final energy consumption in primary energy 
equivalents by fuel type (in the UK)19 
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withdrawal from the EU. Therefore, the consequences of the withdrawal cannot be presented, 
although presupposed outcomes can be examined and applied. It is therefore possible to 
examine existing international associations – options with or without a preferential EU 
relationship – that can be applied as potential relationships for the UK post-withdrawal. 
However, it must be stressed that energy security is one of several areas that a potential post-
withdrawal arrangement encompasses, therefore negotiations within other areas, such as free 
trade and environment, will affect a future collaboration on energy security. 
 
1.2. Research Question and Objectives 
In the previous sections I have stressed the current importance of the IEM for the UK securing 
its supply of gas and explained how the Brexit may threaten this security. Post-Brexit there 
are different options available for the UK to secure its supply of gas, which have been 
presented in the introduction as the ’hard’, the ’soft’ and the ’grey’ Brexit, and the aim of this 
research is therefore to compare the legal aspects of the available options for the UK post-
Brexit and evaluate to what extent these options meet the requirements of securing the supply 
of gas. This aim leads to the following research question: 
 
What options available to the UK post-Brexit provide for the need of a secure 
supply of gas? 
 
To answer this research question this research has a second aim, which is to study the legal 
aspects of the different options available to the UK post-Brexit to safeguard its supply of gas. 
 
This thesis will be written from a state perspective, and it is intended to be of guiding 
principle to inform the decision process of the UK. The analysis will seek to provide the UK 
Government with options to safeguard the supply of gas, through the access of affordable gas 
supplies for the end consumers. In order for the conclusion of this thesis to be of guidance, the 
possible options providing energy security need to be placed within the political perspective 
of the Brexit and be evaluated on whether they meet the requirements of the pro-Brexit camp. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
In order to study the legal aspects of the different options available, I will categorize the 
existing options available into two broad categories, as the nature of a withdrawal from the 
EU limits the number of different post-Brexit scenarios to these two: 1) the UK terminates the 
relationship with the EU governing energy security (‘hard’ Brexit), or 2) the UK continues 
having a preferential relationship with the EU governing energy security (‘soft’ and ‘grey’ 
Brexit). 
 
I will study these categories by investigating the following scenarios that are available within 
these categories: 1a. The UK has relations with third-countries other than the Member States 
of the EU to secure its supply of gas, 1b. The UK covers the domestic need of gas with 
domestically produced gas (the UK becomes self-sufficient), 2a. The UK negotiates to retain 
preferential access to the IEM and adopts regulations thereto, and 2b. The UK negotiates 
other relations with the EU, excluding preferential access to the IEM and the adoption of the 
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regulations thereto.  
 
These existing options will be evaluated by studying the legal aspects of potential bilateral- 
and multilateral agreements for the secure supply of gas for option 1a, and study the domestic 
production of gas in the UK for option 1b. As for options 2a and 2b, I will study a selection of 
existing relationships, which the EU has with third countries. For 2a I will study existing 
third-country relations with the EU where the country participates in the IEM and adopts 
regulations thereto, and for 2b I will study existing third-country relations with the EU where 
the country is not participating in the IEM, and therefore does not apply to the regulations 
thereto. 
 
To be able to define whether these options can potentially secure the UK's supply of gas, I 
will first study the definition of energy security, by defining the term and identifying factors 
affecting the constant flow of gas to the UK. These factors will affect the option that the UK 
chooses post-Brexit, since it plays a vital role in the legislative framework and the policy 
making of the UK. One specific factor affecting the constant flow of gas to the UK is 
interrelated risks. Studying former gas crises that have occurred on the international stage, 
with a particular focus on the EU, I will identify these risks. To study these crises I will 
analyse legal academic texts addressing the security of gas supply and public sources such as 
governmental publications and newspapers. Also, I will examine how the UK currently 
secures its supply of gas through the IEM, as a continued membership of the UK in the IEM is 
one of the options available for the UK post-Brexit. To identify the current legal framework 
governing gas supply security in the UK, I will examine primary and secondary EU 
regulations, as the current energy legislation in the UK is based upon this. I will also examine 
associated sources to understand the function of the regulations and the directives governing 
the IEM (e.g. the European Energy Strategy and Communications from the European 
Commission). 
 
1.3.1. Bilateral- and Multilateral Agreements (Non-EU relations) 
The first discussed option post-Brexit to safeguard the UK's supply of gas is to terminate any 
preferential relations with the EU, and secure its supply of gas by having relations with other 
suppliers than the EU. In this section I will therefore study the legal aspects regarding gas 
security in bilateral agreements to evaluate whether bilateral agreements may achieve to 
secure the supply of gas. This evaluation will identify whether the legal aspects of the 
potential bilateral relations within gas trade fulfils the requirements of energy security.  
 
This study allows me to determine what requirements a potential supplier needs to fulfil, and 
by studying the international trade in gas I will be able to identify potential partners for the 
UK to negotiate supply agreements with. To be able to identify such exporters of gas I will 
study communications from the European Commission addressing external gas suppliers, as 
well as international platforms providing an overview of the trade flow in gas. 
 
Furthermore, the UK can also commit to multilateral trade and energy agreements, implying 
that the UK participates in multilateral frameworks. Multilateral agreements governing trade 
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in energy sources are often region dependent, for example the NAFTA (The North American 
Free Trade Agreement) and the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) applied in North 
America and Asia respectively. As the UK is geographically located in Europe, these 
frameworks will not be accessible for the UK. The European counterpart of such frameworks 
is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)23 and this framework will therefore be under review in 
this thesis. Although most trade agreements are regionally bound, the WTO provides its 
participating states with a global legislative framework: the General Assembly on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).24 With the GATT being a multilateral framework, and accessible for the UK, 
this framework will also be a possibility to the UK and will therefore be evaluated in this 
thesis 
 
To evaluate this option I will engage in an analysis of the international sources of law, 
focusing upon the legal aspects regarding energy security in the WTO, to assess what 
international and regional frameworks there are governing the international energy sector. 
 
1.3.2. Self-sufficiency 
The second option is for the UK to neither have relations with the EU nor relations with third-
countries upon its security of gas supply, as this option implies that the UK needs to secure its 
supply of gas by domestic production. Using data derived from energy evaluations both from 
private (e.g. the BP energy outlook) as well as public sources (e.g. the UK Government and 
the International Energy Agency), I will study to what extent the UK is self-sufficient in its 
domestic gas supply, and whether these supplies can be considered to be secure or not. 
 
1.3.3. EU Relations 
To study the third and the fourth option, both referring to continued relations with the EU; I 
will study the legal aspects of existing bilateral and multilateral aspects of the EU’s external 
energy policy. By identifying the already existing agreements between the EU and third 
countries, it can be determined to what extent the legal aspects of these models can secure the 
UK's supply of gas post-Brexit. The EU has different types of bilateral agreements with third 
countries, and countries will be selected to cover the variety of agreements using sources from 
the European Institutions (e.g. the European Commission and the European Parliament). 
 
The legal aspects of the agreements between the EU and third countries governing energy 
security will be evaluated and the following countries will be reviewed: Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Canada and Albania. Even though the EU has a wide variety of agreements, since 
these countries all have different agreements with the EU, ranging from full integration in the 
IEM ('soft'-Brexit), to no preferential integration in the IEM ('grey'-Brexit), this evaluation 
will provide a complete overview of potential relationships available for the UK to secure the 
supply of gas post-Brexit. Note that the UK could negotiate a non-existing deal with the EU, 
however this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
																																																								
23 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 15 April 1994 (1947) LT/UR/A-1A/1/GATT/1. 
24 International Energy Charter Treaty of May 2015. The Hague, the Netherlands.  
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The country based models will be evaluated according to the following steps: First I will 
evaluate to what extent EU law is incorporated within the legal framework of the model being 
evaluated, and whether the model allows for access to the IEM (the ‘soft’ Brexit) or not (the 
‘grey’ Brexit). Next, I will discuss how the question of energy security is addressed within the 
legal framework of these models. Thirdly, I will evaluate to what extent these countries are 
autonomous within the law making around energy security by studying how the countries are 
involved within the process of decision-making. Finally, I will discuss how the model would 
look like when the legal framework is applied to the UK, and discuss whether it could 
safeguard the UK’s supply of gas. 
 
1.3.4. The Comparative Method 
In order to answer the research question “What options available to the UK post-Brexit 
provide for the need of a secure supply of gas?” I will engage in a comparative analysis, 
which is a methodology where “similar legal systems are compared and placed in correlation 
to each other”, 25 therefore only ,existing options providing a legal framework governing 
energy security can be compared.26 A well-established approach for the comparative analysis 
is the functional analysis, as “[…] in law the only things that are comparable are those which 
fulfil the same function.”27 The available options post-Brexit will be compared upon their 
function to secure the supply of gas for the UK post-Brexit, and I will conclude whether these 
available options will, or will not, secure the UK’s gas supply post-Brexit. The comparative 
method is therefore considered to have an evaluative criterion, concluding that the better of 
several laws – law systems – is that which fulfils its function better than the others.28 
 
Although the use of a functional analysis is well established it is also subject to criticism. One 
of the main points of critique is, according to Ralf Michaels, that “[…] there is not one (‘the’) 
functional method, but many.”29 However, since the Brexit referendum has only taken place 
in June 2016, there is little research on the subject. This research therefore requires a flexible 
approach, which turns this point of critique into one of its strengths. 
 
1.3.5. Options Within the Political Landscape 
Even though the legal aspects of the different options may, or may not, safeguard the UK’s 
supply of gas post-Brexit, whether such an option can be recommended for the UK is also 
dependent upon the political landscape. The pro-Brexit camp amongst the UK’s politicians 
has expressed several aims, which need to be taken into consideration when recommending 																																																								
25 Razak, Adilah Adb. Understanding Legal Research. Integration & Dissemination. Vol. 4 (2009): p. 19. 
26 To start with I want to make clear that I understand the complexity and limitation of using the term legal 
systems. In this thesis legal systems mean the collection of legislative framework, which results directly from the 
government or regional/international institutions. 
27 Zweigert, Konrad and Kotz, Hein. An Introduction to Comparative Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1998. p. 
34, in: Hunter, Tina. Comparative Law as an Instrument in Transnational Law: the example of Petroleum 
Regulation. Bond Law Review. Vol. 21 (2009): p. 46.   
28 Ralf, Michaels. The Functional Method of Comparative Law. In: The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. 
Reimann, Mathias and Zimmermann, Reinhard (ed.) p. 339-382. 2006. p. 340-342. 
29 Ibid, p. 342.  
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post-Brexit legislation. Although these aims are political, they can be expressed within law. I 
will therefore evaluate whether or not the legal aspects of the different options 1) ban the free 
movement of persons, and 2) allow the UK to act as a sovereign state. Furthermore, I will 
engage in a second functional comparison, to study to what extent the different options fulfil 
their function to fulfil the wishes of the pro-Brexit camp. 
 
1.4. Thesis Structure  
After this introduction, in chapter two I will study what energy security means and explain 
how energy can be secured with a focus upon how this can be done from a law perspective.  
 
In the following chapter, chapter three, I will study the UK’s current legislative framework, 
focusing upon the IEM, as the UK currently participates within that framework as an EU 
member and continued participation is one of the options post-Brexit.  
 
Next, in chapter four the legal aspects of Article 50 TEU will be studied and the practical 
implications of these will be discussed. The discussion of the practical implications serves as 
an introduction to the next two chapters as the post-Brexit options can be divided within a 
unilateral withdrawal and a negotiated withdrawal, discussed in chapter five and chapter six 
respectively.  
 
In chapter seven I will engage in a comparative analysis of the different options available 
post-Brexit based upon the function of gas security. Furthermore, in chapter eight, I will 
engage in a second comparative analysis in which the different options post-Brexit will be 
compared upon their function of meeting the arguments of the pro-Brexit camp.  
 
Finally, in chapter nine I will first conclude my results based upon the ability of the different 
options to safeguard the UK’s gas supply. Secondly, I will provide a recommendation both 
based upon the function of gas security as well as the function of meeting the arguments of 
the pro-Brexit camp. 
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2. Energy Security 
2.1. Introduction  
Energy law governs the management of energy sources, which have a fundamental value for 
the society to function as a whole. Because of intensified global consumption the production 
of energy is larger than ever before. The importance of a nation’s future economic 
development raises the realisation of the fundamental role that the energy sector plays in the 
economy.30  Energy industries are massive and require an immense amount of money, 
involving large finance packages stretching over many years. If the energy industry works 
smoothly it forms a large part of the political and economic landscape of a country. However, 
if supply problems occur the society realises its complete dependence on a regular supply of 
energy.31  
 
Society today relies on vast amount of energy, where the end use of natural gas contributes to 
cooking at home, heating and cooling of homes and heating of water. Natural gas also 
generates electric power and is a vital feedstock in the manufacturing sector.32 The Court of 
Justice of the European Union stressed the importance of petroleum33 in the Campus Oil 
Case:  
 
“Petroleum products, because of their exceptional importance as energy sources in the 
modern economy are of fundamental importance for a country’s existence since not 
only its economy but above all its institutions, its essential public services and even the 
survival of its inhabitants depend upon them.”34 
 
Fuelling both industries and private consumption the energy industry has become one of the 
most dominant industries of the twentieth century.35 Natural gas projections demonstrate that 
the world’s growing economies calls for continued exploration and distribution, which inquire 
reliability and affordability.36 
 
The use of conventional energy, fossil fuels,37 expanded during the industrial revolution and 
has, ever since, increased exponential.38 Global natural gas consumption grew by 1.7 per cent 																																																								
30 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 1. 
31 Ibid, p. 2. 
32 United Kingdom Onshore Oil and Gas. Natural Gas Uses. 2016 <http://www.ukoog.org.uk/onshore-
extraction/uses> (Retrieved 2016-10-24). 
33 Petroleum is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons that occur in the Earth in liquid, gaseous, or solid form. The 
term is often restricted to the liquid form, but as a technical term it also includes natural gas. In: Atwater, Gordon 
and Riva, Joseph. Petroleum. Encyclopædia Britannica (2012).  
34 Case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727, para. 7.  
35 Talus, Kim. Internationalization of Energy Law. In Research Handbook on International Energy Law, Talus, 
Kim (ed.), p. 3-17. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2014. p. 3.  
36 Haghighi, Sanam Salem. Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major 
Oil and Gas Supplying Countries. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007. p. 1-3.  
37 Oil, natural gas and coal are natural sources that count as fossil fuels. 
38 Dincer, Imbrahim. Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development: a crucial review. Renewable and 
Sustainable Reviews. Vol. 4, no. 2 (2002): p. 159. 
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in 2015 and global trade in natural gas increased by 3.3 per cent during the same year.39 The 
modern industrial market demands a constant supply of energy and fossil fuels dominates the 
market providing the total world consumption with 80 per cent of the overall demanded 
energy.40  
 
2.2. The Definition of Energy Security   
It is of importance for this thesis to provide the definition of ‘energy security’. However, there 
are many definitions presented, although similar, they tend to be slightly different. This 
section aims to introduce the foremost-accepted definitions, with similar approaches, to give 
the reader an idea of what constitutes energy security.   
 
Sandu-Daniel Kopp presents that Daniel Yergin provided an approach in 1988, which has 
been regarded as the traditional definition of energy security,41 stating that: “The objective of 
energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in 
ways that do not jeopardize national values and objectives.”42 However, according to Sanam 
Salem Haghighi, it is difficult to provide a definition of energy security that is accepted by all. 
Thus, he mentions, a commonly accepted practical definition as “adequacy of energy supply 
at a reasonable price”.43 
 
Along the same line as Daniel Yergin comes the most commonly cited approach to energy 
security, according to Sandu-Daniel Kopp. The definition is known as the ‘Four A’s of 
Energy Security’ and introduced in ‘A Quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century’ by the 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC).44  
 
“This Study defines energy security as the ability of an economy to guarantee the 
availability of energy resources supply in a sustainable and timely manner with the 
energy price being at a level that still not adversely affect the economic performance of 
the economy.”45 
 
Key elements presented in the research done by the APERC for the secure supply of energy 
are the following: the availability of energy reserves (geopolitical factors), the accessibility to 
the necessary infrastructure and transportation needs (geopolitical factors), the affordability of 
																																																								
39 BP Global. Natural Gas – 2015 in review, 2015 <http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-
economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/natural-gas.html> (Retrieved 2016-11-01). 
40 World Energy Council, World Energy Resources – 2013 Survey, London, 2013.  
41 Kopp, Sandu-Daniel. Politics, Markets and EU Gas Supply Security: Case Studies of the UK and Germany. 
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015, p. 47.  
42 Yergin, Daniel. Energy Security in the 1990s. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, no. 1 (1998): p. 111.  
43 Haghighi, Sanam Salem. Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major 
Oil and Gas Supplying Countries. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 2007, p. 14.  
44 Kopp, Sandu-Daniel. Politics, Markets and EU Gas Supply Security: Case Studies of the UK and Germany. 
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015, p. 47-48.  
45 Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre. A Quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century. 2007, p. 6.  
Available at <http://aperc.ieej.or.jp/file/2010/9/26/APERC_2007_A_Quest_for_Energy_Security.pdf>  
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energy security (economic factors), the acceptability of the people (environment and social 
factors), and the ability to acquire supply to meet the demand.46  
 
Onward, this approach has been referred to by the International Energy Agency (IEA),47 
which states that recent literature also uses the ‘Four A’s of Energy Security’ in their attempts 
to define energy security.48 The IEA divides energy security into a long- and short-term 
dimension, stating that the first mainly deals with the investment regime and economic 
developments, while the latter focuses on the ability of the energy system to react promptly to 
sudden unexpected events. It defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of 
energy sources at an affordable price.”49 
 
Furthermore, the European Commission has its own definition stated in its Green Paper 
published in 2000. It defines energy security in line with the above-presented definitions: 
  
“ […] energy supply security must be geared to ensuring, for the well-being of citizens 
and the proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability of 
energy products on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private 
and industrial), while respecting environmental concerns and looking towards 
sustainable development, […]”50 
 
The result of this evaluation shows that all factors indicated – availability, accessibility, 
affordability and acceptability – needs to be assessed when a state drafts its policy framework 
to achieve energy security.  
 
2.3. The Secure Supply of Natural Gas  
Although natural gas has been seen as a secure energy source for many decades, some 
considerable changes have taken place, which challenge its secure status. These changes, 
according to the IEA, stress the importance of the inclusion of natural gas in energy security 
policies. For example, natural gas usage among Member States of the IEA has increased from 
																																																								
46 Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre. A Quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century. 2007 in: Kopp, Sandu-
Daniel. Politics, Markets and EU Gas Supply Security: Case Studies of the UK and Germany. Wiesbaden: 
Springer, 2015, p. 48.  
47 The UK is a member country in the International Energy Agency. Further information available at: 
International Energy Agency. Member Countries. 2016 <http://www.iea.org/countries/membercountries/> 
(Retrieved 2016-10-25).   
48 Jewell, Jessica. The IEA Model of Short-term Energy Security (MOSES): Primary Energy Sources and 
Secondary Fuels. International Energy Agency. 2011.  
Available at <https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/moses_paper.pdf>  
49 International Energy Agency. Energy Supply Security 2014. 2014. p. 13 
<http://www.iea.org/media/freepublications/security/EnergySupplySecurity2014_PART1.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-
10-21) 
50 European Commission. Green Paper on the Security of Energy Supply of the 29 November 2000. Towards a 
European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply. COM (2000) 769 Final.  
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19 per cent in 1973 to 26 per cent in 2012 in the total primary energy supply.51 This growth 
resulted in that gas became the main source of energy in 2000 for the production of heat in 
Europe, taking over solid fossil fuels. It is therefore important to secure gas reserves during 
the cold winter months in Northern-Europe.52 
 
2.3.1. Crises Highlighting the Importance of Energy Security  
In the previous section it has been concluded that it becomes more difficult to secure the 
supply of gas. To increase energy security, resources (e.g. time, money) need to be invested. 
However, since these resources are limited the question arises to what extent energy needs to 
be secured. This has become particularly clear in times of crises, of which we have 
experienced several during the 21st century leading to major energy disruption. When 
shortage in energy supply occurs, especially in natural gas, we understand our over-reliance 
on a constant flow to cover our demand. Energy industries tend to work smoothly in market 
economies, however Kim Talus mentions the following regarding the importance of energy 
supply:  
 
“This changes dramatically if supply problems occur […] In these situations, society 
realizes its complete dependence on a regular supply of energy, which is of more 
critical importance than, say, telecommunications and internet services.”53  
 
Most of the disruptions in energy are caused by weather-related catastrophes, accidents and 
contractual disputes. For example, the Ukrainian crisis, the Arab revolution and the Syrian 
conflict show that underlying political tensions can unexpectedly and rapidly descend into 
chaos. The presented conflicts have different reasons for the unstable climate; however, they 
all resulted in outbreaks causing major energy disruptions. All countries involved are either 
large natural gas exporters or serve as a transit route for gas consuming countries.54  
 
Other recent significant gas crises occurred in the UK, Italy and Ukraine (2006) and Turkey, 
Greece and Australia (2008).55 At the beginning of 2009 Europe suffered its worst gas supply 
disruption to date. The disruption was a result of contractual disputes between Russian 
company Gazprom and its Ukrainian trading partner, leading to a three week long supply 																																																								
51 International Energy Agency. Energy Supply Security 2014. 2014, p. 46 
<http://www.iea.org/media/freepublications/security/EnergySupplySecurity2014_PART1.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-
10-21) 
52 Eurostat. Electricity and Heat Statistics. 2016 <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/0/0a/Derived-heat-production-by-fuel-GWh-EU28-2014-TABLE.png> Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Electricity_and_heat_statistics> (Retrieved 2016-11-
29).  
53 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 2.  
54 De Jong, Sijbren and Widdershoven, Cyril and Kertysova, Katarina and Miladinova, Vesela and Auping, 
Willem. Running out of Gas – Natural Gas Diversification Efforts in the EU Neighborhood. OGEL, Vol. 12, no. 
6 (2015): p. 1-2.  




stop. This resulted in major difficulties due to gas shortages in especially Southern-Europe.56 
Following this disruption, the EU sought to establish common standards for the security of 
gas supply for the EU, and therefore adopted Regulation 994/2010 concerning Measures to 
Safeguard the Security of Gas Supply (the Security of Gas Supply Regulation), now about to 
be repealed by Regulation 0030/2016.57   
 
Crises, like the above mentioned, advocates the need for legislative framework to regulate 
potential threats to the secure supply of natural gas. To prevent a potential crisis or to solve an 
on-going crisis requires comprehensive measures. The regional cooperation in the EU is one 
example where energy security, nowadays, is highly regulated; other multilateral, regional 
and bilateral cooperation with an aim to safeguard the supply of gas will be presented in the 
upcoming chapters.  
 
With former crises in mind we understand the fundamental importance of energy in general, 
and gas in particular, for our economy. A country’s possibility to secure the supply of natural 
gas is dependent on many interrelated factors. Upcoming sections will therefore describe 
transportation methods, trans-boundary trade, long-term agreements in contrary to the spot 
market, and potential risk factors. These factors are of vital importance when assessing a 
country’s capability to secure its supply of natural gas. 
 
2.3.2. Transportation Methods and Infrastructure    
The transportation of natural gas is an important factor when evaluating energy security, since 
a country needs to possess adequate physical infrastructure in order to transport gas over 
significant distances and store gas for peak demands.58 
 
The most common method of transportation of gas to the end consumer is the transmission of 
dry natural gas through pipelines. However, natural gas can also be transported in liquefied 
form (Liquefied Natural Gas) by cargoes such as ships and trucks.59 Infrastructure such as 
pipelines, LNG terminals and transmission networks are therefore an integral part of the gas 
supply chain.60  
 
																																																								
56 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 2.  
57 Regulation, No 0030/2016 of 16 February 2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
Measures to Safeguard the Security of Gas Supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010. COM (2016) 52 
Final.  
58 Natgas. The Transportation of Natural Gas. 2013. <http://naturalgas.org/naturalgas/transport/> (Retrieved 
2016-11-01). 
59 Last mentioned method requires the natural gas to be cooled down to minus 162 degrees, which shrinks the 
volume of the gas 600 times, making it easier to store and transport. In: Shell Global, Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) <http://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/natural-gas/liquefied-natural-gas-lng.html> (Retrieved 
2016-11-01). 
60 Oyewunmi, Tade. Energy Security and Gas Supply Regulation in the European Union's Internal Market. Eur. 
Networks L. & Reg. Q. Vol. 3 (2015): p 195.  
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A country’s physical stockpile of natural gas is not available to the market during normal 
conditions and is therefore used as an emergency ventilator.61 The available storage capacity 
needs to be sufficient, in case of high gas demands to protect consumers and avoid exposing 
them to high and volatile prices.62 Gas stocks are a central part of the gas industry’s structure, 
responding to normal but often large, seasonal and even daily demand fluctuations.63 
Different options exist for the storage of gas, depending on factors such as geological 
structure, economy and commercial demands. Storage of gas either takes place underground 
(e.g. depleted natural gas or oil fields) or aboveground (e.g. LNG terminals) and capacity is 
dependent on what storage type is used.64  
 
2.3.3. Trans-boundary Trade  
Since countries are often not self-sufficient in its gas security (e.g. the UK imports over 60 per 
cent of all its gas, see section 1.1.2), trans-boundary trade is of importance to secure the 
supply of gas. Although gas trade is rigid and mostly regional, due to the global trade in LNG 
the former pipeline-bound gas market has developed from a regional to a global market. Kim 
Talus argues that:  
 
“Because of its network-bound character and because of the costs related to pipeline 
construction, gas cannot easily be redirected to new locations in the short term. LNG 
has changed this to some extent. Much like oil, LNG tankers can easily be re-routed to 
where LNG is most valued and can be sold for the best price.”65  
 
LNG represents a significant change in the market. The technique used for transportation 
increases the opportunity for other suppliers to enter the market, next to the already dominant 
players controlling the gas pipelines.66 The origin of natural gas is therefore not anymore 
regionally bound, as it has become possible to import from producing countries all over the 
world. 
 
2.3.4. Supply Agreements and the Spot Market  
As mentioned previously, many countries are dependent on imports of natural gas. Many 
countries dependent on gas imports therefore commit to supply agreements, which lower the 
risk of a supply shortage. It is therefore important that the country of concern is able to secure 
the imports through economic agreements. Long-term agreements do not guarantee an 
uninterrupted flow of gas, but have traditionally been considered the foundation for a secure 																																																								
61 International Energy Agency. Energy Supply Security 2014. 2014. p. 53-54 
<http://www.iea.org/media/freepublications/security/EnergySupplySecurity2014_PART1.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-
10-21) 
62 Kopp, Sandu-Daniel. Politics, Markets and EU Gas Supply Security: Case Studies of the UK and Germany. 
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015, p. 165.  
63 International Energy Agency. Energy Supply Security 2014. 2014. p. 54-55  
<http://www.iea.org/media/freepublications/security/EnergySupplySecurity2014_PART1.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-
10-21) 
64 Ibid, p. 55-56.  
65 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 101-102.  
66 Ibid, p. 67. 
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energy supply.67 Long-term agreements drafted between buyers and distributors (usually 
different national energy monopolies) provide a medium to long-term security. For the buyer, 
on the one hand, these agreements can provide the basis of investment needed to provide the 
necessary means of infrastructure. For the distributor, on the other hand, these agreements 
secure solid revenue, which is needed for exploration, production and other infrastructural 
needs.68 However, states importing gas do not have the knowledge to estimate the demand for 
natural gas (the demand over time can exceed or drop under the amount of needed gas) over 
time and states can therefore make use of the so called ‘spot market’ which is another 
commercial arrangement where natural gas is bought and sold for an immediate or a very 
near-term delivery.69 It is usually located where numerous of pipelines interconnect, thus 
allowing for the operation of a large number of buyers and sellers.70 Since purchases on the 
spot market do not require a continues arrangement between the buyer and the seller, this 
immediate purchase can be of use when long-term agreements are not sufficient for a 
country’s gas demand.71 
 
Whenever a state needs an increased supply of gas, the solution is bound by the possibilities 
within both the contractual agreements as well as the available infrastructure.  For example, 
gas markets with access to spare import capacity, from either unused pipelines or unused 
LNG terminals, might be more capable to respond to a supply interruption. However, a 
response in the pipeline market is not just dependent on the unused pipeline capacity; it also 
requires that the pipeline is connected to a distributor of gas and whether the current 
contractual relationships allows for an increased purchase of gas. Furthermore, if spare 
capacity exists in the LNG terminals of a certain market, a supply response would be 
dependent on the ability to purchase gas from additional cargoes. LNG is either sold by 
contracts signed before the departure of the cargo or by near-term contracts on the spot 
market. The flexibility that the spot market creates is of importance as the LNG cargoes can 
be released from their current obligations under an agreement, and diverted to a new location 
where the demand is acute.72 In case of a gas supply shortage the spot market therefore 
imposes a substantial response for countries with spare capacity in their LNG terminals.  
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2.3.5. Interrelated Risks for the Secure Supply of Natural Gas  
Jonathan Stern and Sanam Salem Haghighi have defined interrelated risks such as reserve 
depletion, lack of investment in gas fields, insecurity of transit routes and insecurity in energy 
facilities. Additionally, they highlighted the risk related to shortage in necessary 
infrastructure, which is mentioned in section 2.3.3. These risks need to be taken into 
consideration when designing a policy framework for the secure supply of natural gas.73 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, a country needs to maintain the availability and 
accessibility towards distributors of gas. As many new pipelines are built and new 
transportation techniques becomes more affordable (e.g. LNG), gas markets shift from being 
traditionally national and regionally bound, towards a global gas market, increasing the 
number of actors and therefore potential trade partners. This increased global 
interconnectedness of gas markets, in combination with a high global demand for gas, has 
lead to a highly competitive gas market. Diversification of gas suppliers is therefore an 
important part of avoiding domestic gas disruptions. Furthermore, affordability is a 
requirement, as volatile prices are a risk for market actors creating ambiguity. This has proved 
to be an issue over the past decade as energy prices for natural gas have fluctuated, resulting 
in economic uncertainty and mainly financial pressure.74 Next to price fluctuations, other 
factors threaten the ability to safeguard the supply of gas such as the ability to prevent gas 
disruptions and/or act if one occurs. This ability relates to the capacity and function of a 
country’s supply infrastructure, needed investments for the exploration and production of gas, 
contractual arrangements with reliable suppliers and the pricing and cost of the production 
and transportation.75 
 
Furthermore, the European Commission highlights that the vulnerability of a country’s 
security of supply depends on aspects such as the size of domestic production, existing 
suppliers and routes and the possibility to diversify energy sources. For countries in Europe, 
integration into the European pipeline network is of significant importance.76 The EU has 
also, through the Parliament and the Council, identified main areas of concern taking into 
account all relevant risks such as natural disaster, technological, commercial, financial, social, 
political and market-related risks.77  
 
2.4. Goals to Safeguard a Secure Supply of Gas 
To conclude, this chapter has presented the importance of energy security and why this 
subject needs to be regulated. Security of energy supply regularly means security of energy 																																																								
73 Haghighi, Sanam Salem. Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major 
Oil and Gas Supplying Countries. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007; Stern, Jonathan. Security of European Natural 
Gas Supplies: The impact of Import Dependence and Liberalization. London: RIIA, 2002, in: Talus, Kim. EU 
energy law and policy: A Critical Account. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 102. 
74 Heffron, Raphael J. Energy Law: An Introduction. Springer, 2014, p. 38. 
75 Oyewunmi, Tade. Energy Security and Gas Supply Regulation in the European Union's Internal Market. Eur. 
Networks L. & Reg. Q. Vol. 3 (2015): p 195. 
76 European Commission. Security of Gas Supply Regulation. 2016 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-308_sv.htm> (Retrieved 2016-11-03).  
77 Regulation concerning Measures to Safeguard the Security of Gas Supply COM (2016) 52 Final. 
	 24	
consumption, and the goal for the UK is to adopt legislative measures safeguarding the 
supply of gas post-Brexit. Next chapter therefore turns to analyse how the current legislative 
framework in the UK safeguards the supply of gas.  
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3. The UK’s Current Legislative Framework Governing Gas Security 
3.1. Introduction  
In his chapter I will discuss the current legislative framework safeguarding the supply of gas 
in the UK. With the UK being a member of the EU (prior to the Brexit), the UK participates 
in the Energy Community and therefore implements provisions concerning the European 
energy market. The UK is, because of its participation in the IEM, a part of the broad 
structure of gas trade in Europe and under the obligation to adopt energy law deriving from 
the EU. Therefore, in this chapter the EU’s legislative framework governing energy security 
will be examined.  
 
3.2. The Common Market and the European Energy Market  
3.2.1. Introduction 
The aim of the upcoming section is to examine the function of the internal market and the 
IEM. These markets are strongly related, and a part of the economic benefits of the EU 
securing the free movement of goods, persons, services and capitals, whilst enhancing 
developments in the field of energy (e.g. technical, judicial and economical), as the IEM has 
increased European demand and supply of energy. To be able to answer the research question 
of this thesis, on what options there are within energy security for the UK post-Brexit, it is 
vital to explain the IEM. As one of the main goals in the IEM is energy security, expressed in 
Article 194(1) TFEU, this section will further evaluate the IEM in depth.  
 
3.2.2. European Internal Market  
The European Commission recognises that the Single Market, hereinafter referred to as the 
internal market, is one of the major achievements in the EU.78 The establishment of an 
internal market had economic aims as it were to erase disparities among Member States and 
make them stronger competitors relative to actors on the global market. Not only does the 
internal market increase accessibility towards global resources, free trade also allows for 
specialisation leading to competitive advantage, maximising consumer welfare (see section 
1.1.1).79 
 
The aim for the internal market set out in Article 3 of the TEU, read in conjunction with 
Article 26(2) of the TFEU, has a broad conception. Article 3(3) of the TEU states that the 
Union shall work for “a highly competitive social market economy” and the general provision 
in Article 26(2) of the TFEU defines the internal market as an area without internal borders in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capitals is guaranteed making the 
internal market free from discrimination and restrictions that inhibit the free movement.  
 
Regarding the external dimension, the EU has introduced a customs union in accordance with 
Article 28 of the TFEU. This article states that no customs are levied on goods travelling 																																																								
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within the customs union and that members of the customs union impose a common external 
tariff (CET) on all goods entering the area. Furthermore, this provision also confirms that the 
EU negotiates as a single entity in international trade deals.  
 
The formation and development of the customs union, and thereto the internal market, has 
had a significant impact on the legislative framework governing the energy sector which will 
be discussed next.  
 
3.2.3. European Internal Energy Market  
After introducing the general Single Market Programme (i.e. the internal market) the 
European Commission moved towards the development of the IEM.80 When the European 
Commission set to create the IEM, the first comprehensive discussion was introduced in the 
‘Working Document on the Internal Energy Market’ in 1988.81 The goal was the realisation of 
a single energy market, enhancing the removal of potential obstacles to achieve free energy 
flow in Europe and endorse a competition-oriented approach, which would benefit the energy 
sector by improving security of supply and reduce costs.82 The link between the internal 
market and the IEM is most apparent in the usage of the internal market’s provisions as the 
legal basis for the broad legislative initiatives applied in the energy market.83 
 
A second aim of the IEM was to move from state owned or controlled monopolies, towards 
energy markets and contracts, enhancing privatisation, liberalisation and competition.84 This 
was achieved as the IEM removed the limitations of national borders, which previously 
divided European energy markets.85  The gas industry before the IEM was mainly domestic, 
with few if any transnational activities, and the secure supply was a matter for the 
government. However, the increased global trade led to a broader net of actors in the 
market,86 and as a result Member States of the EU took part in a regional cooperation 
adopting a range of provisions governing energy related matters. The development in trans-
boundary gas trade pressured countries to strike deals with exporting countries to secure the 
domestic demand in natural gas (see section 2.3.3); most European countries are importers, 
while the main exporters are located outside the European borders. The EU receives supplies 																																																								
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of natural gas from a variety of countries around the world, and imports 66 per cent of its total 
gas demand. Largest exporter to the EU is Russia and second largest is Norway, who together 
supplies over 40 per cent of the total gas demand in the EU.87  
 
Further development of the energy market has been rapid and multiple provisions have been 
enacted to safeguard the realisation of the market.88 The general energy provision adopted in 
Article 194 TFEU enforced the establishment and functioning of the internal market. In order 
to harmonise and liberalise the EU’s IEM, three consecutive legislative packages of measures 
were adopted between 1996 and 2009. These packages address market access, transparency 
and regulation, supporting interconnection and, adequate levels of supply. Other policies 
related to the IEM, such as the secure supply of gas and the trans-European network for 
transporting gas,89  will be examined closer when introducing provisions governing the 
internal gas market.  
 
A remark for the IEM is the creation of the Energy Community, which is an international 
organisation containing the EU, represented by the European Commission, and the countries 
of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine; these countries are known as the Contracting 
States (CS). The aim of the Energy Community is to extend the EU’s IEM to South-eastern 
Europe and the Black Sea region.90 The Energy Community Treaty91 signed in 2006 governs 
the collaboration and the Treaty recognises an area without internal frontiers and expands the 
IEM to non-members of the EU. The cooperation in the IEM therefore has a broader scope 
than the internal market. 
 
3.2.4. The Internal Energy Market and Energy Security 
Natural gas is recognised as an essential component in the EU’s energy mix and calculates to 
constitute one quarter of the primary energy supply.92 To secure the supply of natural gas the 
EU has engaged in agreements with exporting countries and has decided to work continuously 
active to conclude the best deals possible.93 Many countries in the EU import nearly all their 
supplies and some are also heavily reliant on one single source or single transport route for 
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the majority of its natural gas.94 Natural gas is geologically complicated as it can only be 
extracted in areas suitable for reserves and development. Because of this, countries suitable 
for extraction are limited, which results in the EU being dependent on a very small number of 
suppliers.95  
 
One international agreement enhancing gas trade was concluded with the Russian Federation, 
on the one hand, and the EU and its Member States, on the other.96 With Russia being the 
largest exporter of gas to the EU, supply commitments were included in the EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue.97 However, recent geopolitical tensions between the EU and Russia (e.g. 
the assumed involvement of Russia in the Ukrainian crisis on the one hand and the sanctions 
set by the EU as a response on the other hand) have led to a decreased interest of Russia in the 
European market. This, together with an increased gas demand from China, led Russia to 
engage in an energy supply deal with China in 2014 marking its geopolitical change to the 
east.98 Furthermore, Russia’s increased domestic demand of gas has contributed to weakened 
mutual dependence between the EU and Russia.99 With a weakened relation with Russia and a 
declining production of gas in the North Sea, the EU has a compelling need to diversify 
energy routes (being less dependent on one single supplier of gas). Countries with gas wealth 
of interest for the external supplies are, Algeria, Iran and the Caspian region (Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) for dry gas, and Nigeria, Angola and Qatar for 
liquefied gas.100 The EU now aims to build new transit routes such as the Southern Gas 
Corridor101 to diversify its gas supply by bringing gas in from the Caspian countries.102 
Potential market entrants need to be able to access both transit and import infrastructure to 
bring gas from the delivery point to the consumption area.103 This is one major consideration 
being addressed below.  
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3.3. The Legislation of the European Energy Market 
The principal of conferral means that the EU only has the competence conferred on it by the 
Treaties (TEU and TFEU). The EU may therefore only act when it is needed to attain 
objectives specifically regulated in the Treaties. As the division of competence differs, energy 
is specified as a shared competence in Article 4 of the TFEU, also specified under title XXI of 
the TFEU and Article 194 of the TFEU. In accordance with Article 2(2) of the TFEU shared 
competence means that the Union and its Member States may adopt legislation and legally 
binding acts in the area of concern. A Member State is however only allowed to exercise its 
competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence in the same matter. 
Article 194 TFEU addresses energy matters and was essential when the EU formalised and 
enabled the European energy regulations and policies. Article 194 (1)(a) of the TFEU 
provides that EU energy policy shall aim to ensure the functioning of the energy market. This 
provision also specifies the following objectives; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the 
Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
Furthermore, Article 194(2) of the TFEU provides that the European Parliament and the 
Council, after consulting with the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, shall adopt legislative measures – secondary law – to assure that the objectives in 
paragraph 1 of Article 194 TFEU are achieved; thus, the EU develops its own energy law and 
the energy policies applicable in its Member States. With this legislative power, the EU has 
become a major actor in the international energy market.104 
The objective of the European energy legislation is to ensure fair market access and a high 
level of consumer protection, but also satisfactory interconnection. To achieve these aims in 
the energy sector, trade barriers have been removed and tax and price policies are 
approximated. The essence of the market regulations was the introduction of the freedom of 
choice. This was encourage to allow Member States of the EU and CS of the Energy 
Community to engage in the business of and trade in energy, the development of the 
infrastructure, the choice to export and import, together with the choice to select suppliers to 
negotiate with. To introduce these freedoms, legal obstacles such as exclusive rights needed 
to be eliminated.105 Provisions regarding the energy market have taken place in three different 
rounds, where a whole set of regulations has been presented in energy packages. The term, 
energy package, is not a legal term but was used to declare that each package consists of a 
variety of multiple regulations (regulations concerning electricity and natural gas). 
 
3.3.1. History of the Energy Packages 
The First Energy Package was introduced in 1998 for gas; the Second Energy Package in 
2003 but implemented in 2004; and the Third Energy Package was adopted in 2009. These 
energy packages aims to increase resilience and reduce dependency. The first step taken 
towards a liberalised market was the limited third-party access regime to the transmission and 																																																								
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distribution network, and the introduction of legal unbundling. These legislative tools, 
presented in the First Energy Package, were important in the opening up of national 
monopolies.106  
 
The Second Energy Package, also called the acceleration package, focused on competition by 
enhancing the third-party access regime and the legal unbundling. Recital two of the Gas 
Directive from 2003,107 established in the second package, recognised the need to reduce 
market dominance and predatory behaviour by incumbents, while ensuring non-
discriminatory transmission and distribution tariffs and the rights of vulnerable customers to 
be protected. It also recognised the importance of effective monitoring of supply and demand 
balance in Member States and CS, the construction and maintenance in infrastructure and 
interconnection capacities and compatibility of EU competition rules with long-term gas 
supply contracts.108 The important liberalisation measure introduced, was the obligation in 
Member States to fully open up their gas markets by improving the existing third-party access 
regime. This eventually resulted in a regulated third-party access and rules laying down legal, 
operational and information related unbundling.109 
 
After the European Commission’s Energy Sector Inquiry110 in 2007, it was confirmed that the 
Second Gas Directive failed to achieve a competitive and transparent internal market for gas. 
Because of natural gas production being restricted by geological factors – with most locations 
of production situated beyond EU borders – there was a need to increase the access to transit 
and to import capacity, to enhance energy security. Consequently the third energy package 
was adopted, which aimed at strengthening security of gas supply by ensuring a more 
effective ownership unbundling, efficient competition and third-party access to the market.111 
 
3.3.2. Third Energy Package  
To date the Third Energy Package is in force in the EU and consists of the following 
directives and regulations: the Electricity Directive,112 the Gas Directive,113 the Regulation on 																																																								
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the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators,114 the Regulation on Cross-Border 
Electricity,115 and the Regulation on Access to the Natural Gas Transmission Network.116 
However, since natural gas is the focus in this thesis, only directives and regulations 
concerning the gas market will be of relevance for further examination.  
 
To improve the functioning of the energy market and enhance the liberalisation, a Third 
Energy Package was introduced. The Third Energy Package is designed to protect and benefit 
customers. The internal market in natural gas aims to deliver real choice for all consumers of 
the EU, no matter whether the end consumers are private homes or business. This is of 
significant importance so as to achieve competitive prices and contribute to security of supply 
in accordance with the Regulation on Access to the Natural Gas Transmission Network. 
Third-party access is based on published tariffs, applied in a transparent and non-
discriminatory way, which benefits consumers (Article 41 of the Gas Directive). 
 
Aiming to secure the supply of natural gas and to improve the distribution of natural gas in a 
liberalised energy market enhancing competition and energy security, the Third Energy 
Package has five main provisions, which will be explained next.  
 
3.3.2.1. Unbundling  
Unbundling is the separation of energy supply and generation from the operation of 
transmission networks. Without effective separation of networks from activities of production 
and supply, there is a risk of discrimination (Article 6 of the Gas Directive). The owner of the 
pipeline infrastructure cannot deny other suppliers of natural gas to send gas through its 
networks; instead consumers can buy gas from other suppliers than the owner of the 
transportation network. Through the third-party access regime transport of energy is separated 
from production and sale, by allowing distributors of gas access to national networks, 
interconnections and transit pipelines.117 The purpose of this system is to make sure that the 
IEM does not suffer from vertical integration. Vertically integrated companies118, therefore 
have to run the transport of gas as a ‘separate business’. The European Commission stresses 
that:  
 
“If a single company operates a transmission network and generates or sells energy at 
the same time, it may have an incentive to obstruct competitors' access to 
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infrastructure. This prevents fair competition in the market and can lead to higher 
prices for consumers.”119 
 
3.3.2.2. Independent Regulators  
In order to ensure the objective of a competitive market the EU enforced the provision 
requiring independent regulators for the application of the rules. To accomplish a highly 
competitive market national regulators need to be independent from both industry interests 
and governments in accordance with Article 30 of the Gas Directive.   
“Energy regulators need to be able to take decisions in relation to all relevant 
regulatory issues if the internal market in natural gas is to function properly, and to be 
fully independent from any other public or private interests.” 
3.3.2.3. Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators  
In order to help the different national regulators cooperate and ensure the smooth functioning 
of the IEM, the EU established the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
regulated in Article 31 of the Gas Directive. Of importance is that the ACER is independent 
from the European Commission, national governments and energy companies. 120  By 
cooperating with national regulatory authorities and transmission system operators, it 
enhances a true competitive energy market in Europe (Article 7 of the Gas Directive). 
 
3.3.2.4. Cross-border Cooperation  
The development of a true internal market in natural gas requires regulatory control over 
cross-border interconnections in the regional market (Article 57 of the Gas Directive). 
National transmission systems are responsible for ensuring that natural gas is effectively 
transported through pipelines. The European energy market is dependent on cross-border 
trade, and to ensure the function of this network, the European Network for Transmission 
System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) was established.121  
 
3.3.2.5. Security of Gas Supply  
The general Internal Gas Market Directive is linked to security issues as presented above.       
Security of gas supply has always been one of the prioritised objectives in the IEM, with most 
legislative instruments in the field of energy per se containing provisions regulating energy 
security matters.122 The key object for the market is to ensure access for every supplier and 
consumer, and to provide links between otherwise isolated areas; this includes the access to 
transport and import capacity. Unavailable cross-border capacity and discriminatory access 
																																																								
119 European Commission. Market Legislation. 2016 <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-
consumers/market-legislation> (Retrieved 2016-11-10).  
120 Ibid.  
121 European Commission. Market Legislation. 2016 <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-
consumers/market-legislation> (Retrieved 2016-11-10) and European Network for Transmission System 
Operators for Gas. <http://www.entsog.eu> (Retrieved 2016-11-10).   
122 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 106.  
	 33	
procedures hamper the integration of the market.123 Measures such as unbundling, third-party 
access and efficient competition reduce prices and contributes to the secure supply of natural 
gas.  
 
3.3.3. Measures to Safeguard the Security of Gas Supply  
The Regulation concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Gas Supply (the Security of 
Gas Supply Regulation)124 entered into force in 2010 and repealed the former Gas Supply 
Directive from 2004. The importance of energy security was marked by the shift from a 
directive to a regulation, shifting more responsibility and power to EU level. The adoption of 
the Security of Gas Supply Regulation was a reaction of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2009 
resulting in gas supplies being cut in the cold months of the winter creating severe difficulties 
in Europe (see section 2.3.1).125   
 
The Security of Gas Supply Regulation requires the Member States of the EU and the CS of 
the Energy Community, to engage in a regional cooperation increasing interconnection. This 
will, according to the EU, result in an interdependent market, enhancing regional cooperation. 
The Security of Gas Supply Regulation spells out that:  
 
”The regional cooperation under this Regulation builds on existing regional 
cooperation involving natural gas undertakings, Member States and national 
regulatory authorities to enhance, among other objectives, the security of supply and 
the integration of the internal energy market […]”126 
 
3.3.3.1. National Measures  
3.3.3.1.1. The Preventive- and Emergency Action Plan  
The Security of Gas Supply Regulation obliges Member States and CS to perform a risk 
assessment in accordance with Article 9. The risk assessment requires Member States and CS 
to evaluate interrelated risks, such as the risks mentioned in section 2.3.5, in order to draft a 
Preventive Action Plan and an Emergency Action Plan (Articles 4, 5 and 10 of the Security of 
Gas Supply Regulation). Whereas the Preventive Action Plan is aimed at taking preventive 
measures, the Emergency Plan deals with situations where the Preventive Action Plan fell 
short and a crisis has occurred. It includes specific procedures that could come into effect 
during a disruption and how these actions will be coordinated with other national authorities. 
The Preventive Action Plan and the Emergency Plan create a system involving different 
security of supply responses, with different players, depending on the impact of the 
disruption. Measures to prevent or act in case of an emergency could either be directed to 
industry, Member State, regional or EU level.127  																																																								
123 De Hauteclocque, Adrien and Talus, Kim. Third Party Access: A Comparative Study on Access Regimes in 
EU Electricity Grids and Natural Gas Pipelines. OGEL, Vol. 9, no. 3 (2011): p. 1.  
124 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of 20 October 2010 concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Gas Supply 
repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC. 
125 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 102-103.  
126 Annex IV of the Gas Supply Regulation (EU) No 994/2010.  
127 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 102-103. 
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3.3.3.1.2. The N-1 Supply Standard  
The Security of Gas Supply Regulation also defines a certain supply standard. Member States 
and CS must be prepared to meet this standard even in case of a disruption. The standard is 
called the ‘N-1’ and the formula describes the ability, or the technical capacity, of the gas 
infrastructure during a day of exceptional high demand occurring with a statistical probability 
of once in 20 years. 128  This standard requires that countries must be able to supply at least 30 
days’ worth of gas to private households, but also vulnerable consumers like hospitals.129  
 
3.3.3.2. Market-Based Measures  
The EU’s energy policy constitutes a broad scope of provisions enhancing energy security. 
The Security of Gas Supply Regulation lists market-based measures in Annex II covering 
areas identified to secure the supply of natural gas. All Member States and CS shall take into 
account the indicative and exhaustive list of measures such as increased production and 
import flexibility, commercial gas storage, diversification of gas supplies and gas routes, use 
of long-term and short-term contracts, investment in infrastructure, contractual arrangements 
to ensure security of gas supplies etc. The current European energy legislation therefore, 
through the Security of Gas Supply Regulation, covers all the interrelated risks regarding the 
secure supply of natural gas as described in chapter two, with a special focus in section 2.3.5. 
 
3.3.3.3. EU Coordinated Measures  
In 2016, the Commission proposed an update to its Security of Gas Supply Regulation.130 The 
purpose of the draft was to ensure that all Member States and CS engage in appropriate 
actions to prepare for and manage the effect of a gas shortage or a major gas disruption. To 
meet this objective the drafted regulation proposes a stronger regional coordination. Under 
Article 194 of the TFEU a certain level of coordination, transparency and cooperation is 
necessary to adapt measures taken by the Member States and the CS, which is of importance 
to make sure that the energy market functions properly. With increased interconnection and 
the obligation of the corridor approach,131 the EU calls for an increased coordination among 
Member States and CS. It was stated that national security of supply measures is likely to 
adversely affect other Member States and CS, or the security of supply at EU level. Because 
of the interconnected gas market coordinated action can avoid major gas supply disruptions. 
Namely, a measure taken in one country can cause a shortage of gas in neighbouring 
countries. Situations like the cold spell in 2012 and the stress test committed in 2014132 
demonstrate the vital importance of such a coordination and solidarity in the gas market.133 
 																																																								
128 Annex IV of the Gas Supply Regulation (EU) No 994/2010. 
129 European Commission. Secure Gas Supplies. 2016. <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-
secure-supplies/secure-gas-supplies> (Retrieved 2016-11-11).  
130 Regulation No 0030/2016, on Measures to Safeguard the Security of Gas Supply, COM (2016) 52 Final. 
131 The corridor approach means that all Member States along a gas transmission pipeline should assess all the 
potential benefits beyond their borders for permanent gas reverse flow on a pipeline.  
132 The ’stress test’ is explained in section 3.3.3.3.1.		
133 Regulation No 0030/2016, on Measures to Safeguard the Security of Gas Supply, COM (2016) 52 Final. 
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3.3.3.3.1. Energy Security Strategy  
In response to concerns surrounding the delivery of Russian gas via Ukraine, the EU 
introduced the EU Energy Security Strategy in 2014.134 As a part of this Strategy, the EU 
conducted the so-called stress test during the winter of 2014/2015. The Strategy presents 
measures needed to increase energy production, as well as completing insufficient 
infrastructure. These measures were addressed to increase the possibility to redirect natural 
gas to where it is needed during a potential crisis.  The stress test preformed in the European 
energy market (2014), preformed under supervision of the European Commission, analysed 
the impact of potential gas disruptions in various European countries. The test was carried out 
in 38 European countries, including CS in the Energy Community, and showed that a 
prolonged supply disruption would have substantial impact in the EU. However, if all 
countries cooperate with each other, protected consumers would remain supplied even in the 
event of a six-month gas disruption.135  
 
The Strategy identifies areas where concrete actions implemented in shorter-, medium- and 
longer-term needs to be taken to be able to respond quickly to energy security concerns. It is 
based on eight key pillars that together promote closer cooperation beneficial for all Member 
States and CS while respecting national energy choices,136 covering the important aspects of 
energy security mentioned in chapter two.  
 
3.3.3.4. The Importance of the European Energy Market  
The need for EU action is clear, given the evidence that national approaches both result in 
sub-optimal measures and aggravate the impact of a crisis. A measure taken in one country 
can cause a shortage of gas in neighbouring countries.137 The stress test preformed strengthens 
the theory that the EU safeguards the supply of natural gas better as a unit.  
 
Third party access, unbundling and transparency are central elements in the legal energy 
regime and were introduced to break natural monopolies by the establishment of a highly 
competitive energy market. This in turn, together with measures adopted in the Security of 
Gas Supply Regulation, contributes to the secure supply of natural gas for the Member States 
of the EU and the CS of the Energy Community.  
 
The study of the EU’s energy legislation indicates that the framework presented in this 
chapter preforms perfect safety measures, without any flaws. There are however very few, if 
any, legislative frameworks that works fully according to the objectives provided; the EU’s 
energy legislation is no exception. Even though current energy market provisions provide 
measures safeguarding energy security, former crises prove the inability to prevent shortages 																																																								
134 Energy Security Strategy COM (2014) 330 Final.  
135 Energy Community. Stress tests. 2016 <https://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/AREAS_OF_WORK/Instruments/Security_of_Supply/Stress_te
sts> (Retrieved 2016-11-11).  
136 Energy Security Strategy COM (2014) 330 Final. 
137 Regulation No 0030/2016, on Measures to Safeguard the Security of Gas Supply, COM (2016) 52 Final. 
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and disruptions in the EU’s gas supply. The constant need for assessments, developments and 
improvements, prove that the current legal framework does not provide fully sufficient tools 
to secure the supply of natural gas. It is however a developed framework with the objective to 
provide a constant flow of gas.  
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4. The Brexit 
4.1. Introduction  
Chapter three presented that the UK currently participates in the EU’s energy security regime 
to safeguard its supply of gas. However, with the upcoming Brexit scenario the UK might 
break with the legal framework providing for energy security. This chapter will address 
possible ways for the UK to withdraw from the EU, as these political considerations might 
limit the UK’s options post-withdrawal. The lack of publicised strategy for the UK leaves us 
with the question on how the Government intend to proceed in the negotiation process with 
the EU. In order to discuss possible legal outcomes within the energy sector it is vital to 
attempt to discover current events.  
 
4.2. Current Events 
The UK has throughout decades, dating back to its decision to join the EU in 1973, been 
agitated for EU withdrawal. Former Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron, rejected calls 
for a referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU 2012 but announced that his 
Conservative Government would hold a referendum on this matter if he were to be re-elected. 
Soon after he was voted in for a second term, ‘The European Union Act 2015’ was introduced 
in the UK Parliament to start the process of a referendum.138  
 
Up to date, reporting and commentary on the impact of Brexit, have provided little of use for 
policy-makers and business. However, Theresa May stated that the UK will strike a deal as an 
‘independent, sovereign state’ and told delegates that “We are going to be a fully independent, 
sovereign country – a country that is no longer part of a political union with supranational 
institutions that can override national parliaments and courts.”139 Despite what Theresa May 
said during her public appearance in October, no clear answer is possible to present on what 
aims the UK has for its future relations with the EU. The climate in Europe is tense after the 
referendum in June, and neither the UK nor the EU shows any interest in sharing its ambition 
for future relations before the start of the negotiation period. However, in September 2016 EU 
heads of state and government met in Bratislava, where they concluded that it is a critical 
time for the European project. It was the first time they met as 27 Member States, where the 
UK was excluded. The Bratislava Summit of 27 Member States was devoted to diagnose the 
present state of the EU and to discuss the common future.140 They all agreed upon the 
following general principles:  
 
“Although a country has decided to leave, the EU remains indispensible for the rest of 
us. In the aftermath of the wars and deep divisions on our continent, the EU secured 
peace, democracy and enabled our countries to prosper. Many countries and regions 
																																																								
138 Lyengar, Rishi. These 3 facts explain why the UK held the Brexit Referendum. Time. 2016-06-24 
<http://time.com/4381184/uk-brexit-european-union-referendum-cameron/> (Retrieved 2016-10-06) 
139 Brexit: Theresa May to trigger Article 50 by end of March. BBC News. 2016-10-02  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37532364> (Retrieved 2016-10-16). 
140 The Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap of 16 September 2016 [The Bratislava Declaration]. 
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outside still only strive for such achievements. We are determined to make a success of 
the EU with 27 Member States, building on this joint history”.141 
 
At the end of the meeting European Council President, Donald Tusk, stressed that the EU will 
“protect the interests of the 27, not the leaving country”.142 Furthermore, the head of the 
executive European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, stated, “We want to have a very good, 
very close relation with the UK. At the same time, it is not possible for these negotiations to 
damage our interests”.143  
 
The declaration concluded in Bratislava implies that the main goal for the EU is to seek 
favourable terms for the remaining Member States. Political statements, e.g. statements from 
Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, shows that the UK will struggle to negotiate 
preferable terms for itself since the EU clearly has decided to preserve its own common 
interests. This means that there is a high probability that the UK will only be able to strike 
preferable deals for itself within matters that will benefit the EU jointly.  
 
4.3. Possible Ways to Withdraw from the EU 
Brexit invites for different ways to withdraw from the EU, one of them being a unilateral 
withdrawal, referred to as the ‘hard’ Brexit and one of them being a negotiate withdrawal, 
referred to as the ‘soft’ and the ‘grey’ Brexit.  
 
4.3.1. Unilateral Withdrawal 
The UK could, by repealing the 1972 European Communities Act,144 unilaterally withdraw its 
membership in the EU by relying on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).145 The 1972 European Communities Act was the piece of legislation that brought the 
UK into the EU. It gives EU law supremacy over the UK’s national law. A large amount of 
EU law effective in the UK currently relies on this Act and this legislation will remain until 
terminated. Article 56 of the VCLT provides that where a treaty contains no provision 
regarding its termination, there is a rebuttable presumption that it cannot be unilaterally 
denounced unless it can be shown that the parties intended to admit the possibility, or a right 
of withdrawal can be inferred from the terms of the treaty.  
 
The right for a Member State to withdraw its membership in the EU is acknowledge under 
Article 50 of the TEU, which constitutes procedural actions rather than substantive 
conditions. Article 50 of the TEU admits the right of a Member State to withdraw from the 
Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. Accordingly, the TEU consists 																																																								
141 Ibid.  
142 Foster, Peter and Rothwell, James. Bratislava Summit: Europe’s ‘United front’ proves a fragile façade as 
leaders refuse to share a stage. The Telegraph. 2016-09-16 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/16/eu-
bratislava-summit-donald-tusk-calls-for-sober-and-brutally-ho1/> (Retrieved 2016-10-21).  
143 Ibid.   
144 European Communities Act 1972 (c. 68), an act to make provision in connection with the enlargement of the 
European Communities to include the United Kingdom, together with (for certain purposes) the Channel Islands, 
the Isle of Man and Gibraltar, enacted the 17th of October 1972.  
145 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. 1155 UNTS 331 [Vienna Convention].  
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a provision concerning a Member State’s right to withdraw. Therefore, there is a possibility 
for the UK to withdraw its membership in the EU unilaterally under Article 56 of the VCLT. 
A unilateral withdrawal would give the same result as if the UK and the EU initiated their 
negotiations but were to be unsuccessful in concluding a withdrawal agreement within the 
period of two years set out in Article 50(3) of the TEU.146 
 
If the UK would proceed with a unilateral withdrawal or if no withdrawal agreement were 
successfully concluded between the UK and the EU within the timeframe of two years, the 
UK would be independent relative to the EU’s Member States. The unilateral withdrawal will 
be addressed as the ‘go-it-alone’ model, and this post-withdrawal option will be examined 
further in chapter five following the theory of energy security.  
 
4.3.2. Negotiated Withdrawal 
In contrast to a unilateral withdrawal, the UK could according to Article 50(2) of the TEU 
negotiate and conclude a withdrawal agreement with the EU, settling the arrangements for 
itself when withdrawing and taking account for the framework of its future relationship with 
the Union.147 Article 50(3) TEU consist the following provision concerning the withdrawal 
agreement: 
 
“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the 
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 
2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously 
decides to extend this period.” 
 
Accordingly, Article 50 of the TEU is enforced to protect the foundation of earlier 
cooperation between the state of concern and the EU, by guaranteeing a smooth transition for 
everyone involved. A negotiated withdrawal therefore implies that the UK and the EU would 
engage in a continued preferential relationship. This post-withdrawal option will be examined 
further in chapter six following the theory of energy security.  
  
																																																								
146 Given that the EU’s Member States decide to not prolong the negotiation period.  
147 The withdrawal agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the TFEU.  
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5. Unilateral Withdrawal  
5.1. Introduction 
As a result of the 40 yearlong relationship between the UK and the EU, the UK participates in 
many agreements through its EU membership. Notable, is that the EU up to date has over 50 
agreements with third-countries, which the UK would be excluded from upon withdrawal. To 
regain the benefits these agreements provide the UK with, it would either have to renegotiate 
all of the agreements or become a signatory party in its own right.148 In this chapter I will 
discuss the latter option where the UK would act internationally on the basis of its own 
statutory provisions, not bound by regulations adopted by the EU, also referred to as the 
‘hard’ Brexit. The UK would therefore be referred to as an independent and sovereign state 
and I refer to this as the ‘go-it-alone’ model (see section 4.3.1). Accordingly this model 
represents the greatest degree of independence from the EU and this future option would 
result in drastic changes for the UK given the current deep-rooted cooperation with the EU. 
 
Some might consider the ‘go-it-alone’ model as the least attractive option, while others are 
thrilled about the many possibilities it provides. The withdrawal from the EU introduces the 
possibility to negotiate bilateral agreements with third countries – non-EU Member States – in 
its own power, and the possibility to commit to multilateral agreements as an independent 
signatory. However, next to committing to these agreements, breaking with the EU also give 
the UK the possibility to not negotiate or commit to any relations and become self-sufficient 
in its energy demands. 
 
The first section of this chapter is therefore devoted to examine the opportunities within bi- 
and multilateral agreements in the light of gas security, whilst the second section will 
evaluate the possibility of self-sufficiency. 
 
5.2. International Trade and Energy Agreements and Energy Security  
5.2.1. Bilateral Agreements   
The legal definition of a bilateral agreement is an agreement formed by and exchange of a 
promise in which the promise of one party is consideration supporting the promise of the 
other party. Meaning that the bilateral agreement is committed between two parties, each 
promising to do something. These parties can be individuals, groups, businesses or 
governments engaging in mutually binding obligations.149 
 
A bilateral agreement is usually considered more flexible than its regional and multilateral 
counterpart, due to fewer parties participating. The reasons to engage in bilateral agreements 
are many: enhanced trade, commercial policy, political stability, economical advancements 
and a range of other reasons, which contributes to a deeper integration between the parties 
																																																								
148 European Commission. Trade Agreements. 2016 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/agreements/index_en.htm> (Retrieved 2016-10-16).   
149 The Law Dictionary. What Are Bilateral Agreements? <http://thelawdictionary.org/article/what-are-bilateral-
agreements/> (Retrieved 2016-11-22).   
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concerned.150 Today, non-tariff barriers play a more important role in bilateral agreements, 
since it removes obstacles to trade. However, due to the fact that bilateral agreements increase 
integration between the parties of concern, adoption of new laws and the creation of 
administrative bodies have become more usual.151  
 
Energy security is one of the reasons to engage in bilateral agreements, such as Japan seeking 
security of supply commitments with Indonesia. 152  Bilateral trade agreements enable 
countries to regulate its energy security standards in-between, and provide a good option for 
tailored agreements between gas importing countries and gas exporting countries. To date the 
UK imports a large share of gas, and this demanded amount could potentially be safeguarded 
through bilateral dialogues with reliable exporters. The bilateral approach therefore becomes 
an important consideration under the ‘go-it-alone’ model. The UK could, as Japan, engage in 
gas trade agreements with supplier countries of natural gas.  
 
However, the UK’s participation in the deregulation of natural monopolies in the IEM 
resulted in privatised trade and the freedom of choice regarding energy sources. Being a 
market economy leaves economic decisions and the price setting solely guided by interactions 
of the UK’s individual citizens and business, resulting in only little intervention by the UK 
Government. Societal and economic decisions regarding investment, production and 
distribution are based on the interplay of supply and demand. Following this line bilateral gas 
supply agreements in the UK would have to be committed between companies. Of interest is 
either the liquefied gas market or the dry gas market.  
 
5.2.1.1. Liquefied Natural Gas Market  
The UK is not yet importing a large share of gas from the LNG market, only 17 per cent,153 
but might consider evolving this option due to the EU withdrawal. The UK has three LNG 
import facilities and together these are capable of meeting nearly 50 per cent of UK’s annual 
demand.154 However the UK needs to secure that gas is available for trade, by concluding 
supply agreements with exporters of LNG. Accordingly, distribution companies of gas in the 
UK can purchase gas from LNG exporting countries, engaging in bilateral supply agreements 
with companies of interest. LNG exporting countries, as potential gas trading partners, was 
mention in section 3.2.4. The current majority of LNG delivered to the UK is from Qatar, 
under long-standing agreements, rather than traded on a spot basis (see section 2.3.4 for 
supply agreements and the spot market).155 																																																								
150 Cattaneo, Olivier. The Political Economy of PTAs. In Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements. Lester, 
Simon and Mercurio, Bryan (ed.), p. 28-51. Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 42.  
151 Ibid, p. 51-52.  
152Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Indonesia for an Economic Partnership of August 2017 
(JIEPA).  
153 British Gas. Where Does UK Gas Come From? 2015 <https://www.britishgas.co.uk/the-source/our-world-of-
energy/energys-grand-journey/where-does-uk-gas-come-from> (Retrieved 2016-12-01).  
154 UK Energy. Liquefied Natural Gas. 2015 <http://www.energy-uk.org.uk/energy-industry/gas-generation/gas-
supplies.html> (Retrieved 2016-11-25).  
155 LNG Industry. Britain Position for Additional LNG as Reloads Begin <https://www.lngindustry.com/special-
reports/23072015/britain-positions-for-additional-lng-as-reloads-begin-/> (Retrieved 2016-11-25).  
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5.2.1.2. Pipeline Gas Market   
This section is devoted to study countries of interest for the UK to make bilateral supply 
agreements with in the pipeline market and only countries connected by pipelines to the UK 
are of interest. Accordingly, because of UK’s pipeline connection to continental Europe, the 
UK could make supply agreements with all countries directly connected to the EU. The EU 
would then transit the gas through the continent to the UK (transit is explained in section 
5.1.2).  
 
The largest exporter of gas to the EU is Russia and the UK could therefore trade gas with 
Russia. However, due to weakened relations between the EU and Russia, presented in section 
3.2.4, this option seems rather unattractive.  
 
Another gas producing country of interest is Norway. Norway is currently the second largest 
supplier of natural gas in the EU and according to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
hydrocarbon production on the Norwegian shelf is expected to remain relatively stable for at 
least the upcoming ten years. However, a report published by Wood Mackenzie,156 Norway 
expects a decline in oil and gas investment by over $50 billion between 2016 and 2020. In the 
long-term, new discoveries will be crucial to the sustained production of Norwegian gas.  
 
The operator of natural gas transportation in Norway, Gassco AS, completed three pipelines 
last year from Norway to the UK, where the first pipelines completed in Norway in five years, 
all were destined to the UK; making the UK one of Norway’s largest purchaser of gas. The 
falling production of gas in the UK has necessitated the UK to continue a steady import of 
natural gas. Yet, the falling investments in Norwegian exploration of gas impose a risk of less 
gas being exported from Norway to the UK.157 
 
Notable, is that the Norwegian resource base has not yet been explored because of the huge 
maritime territory involved: the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea.158 
Although Norway has been a reliable supplier for many years, it now requires incentives to 
continue its exploration and extraction. Together with decreasing prices in natural gas, 
Norway finds itself in a position where it needs to consider whether further exploration will 
be profitable. Another considerable factor in this matter is the increased participation among 
countries worldwide to decrease the use of energy resources contributing to carbon dioxide 
emissions. In the ‘World Energy Resources Survey’, it was presented that coal, oil, gas and 
nuclear will provide for less than 15 per cent of the total energy consumption in the world by 
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2100, while renewable energy will provide around 70 per cent.159 The aim for a sustainable 
future, has led the EU to impose legislative framework enhancing the development of 
renewable resources.160 This increased promotion of renewable resources has resulted in less 
secure markets for fossil fuels, undermining investor confidence and discouraging Norway. 
Against this backdrop, the UK’s decision to withdraw its membership in the EU would leave 
them outside the European climate agenda, allowing for it to choose natural gas as a key 
source in its energy mix.161  
 
Consequently natural gas from Norway could be an alternative to supply the UK with gas in 
the long-term. For Norway to engage in exploitation of new fields, providing natural gas 
requires assured markets and predictable terms. However, it is not for the UK Government to 
conclude such long-term gas supply agreements, but rather for the companies distributing gas 
in the UK. Because of the liberalised market, introducing freedom of choice, companies buy 
from the cheapest supplier due to competitive advantage. In this sense, it is not for the UK 
Government to directly intervene, although it could intervene indirectly by incentivising UK 
companies to conclude bilateral supply agreements with Norwegian gas suppliers through 
favourable tax regimes and investment subsidies. With the domestic production of gas in the 
UK, competition would be assured and together with already existing physical 
interconnection the UK would be an appealing market for Norwegian gas. With UK as a 
potential market, Norway could uphold its exploration and extraction of gas. This action 
would though depart from the general policy of a market economy, and might not be 
considered a real life option. However, it is an option that needs consideration, since it can 
contribute to the secure supply of natural gas for the UK post-Brexit.  
 
5.2.2. Multilateral Agreements 
International energy law has an important role in enabling, facilitating and stabilising the 
functioning of the international energy market. The main reason for introducing regulations 
governing the energy market is to ensure that energy and energy resources can be traded 
across borders, which is enhanced somewhat through multilateral agreements. In addition, 
bilateral agreements, stabilises the relations between domestic and foreign energy companies 
or governments (see section 5.2.1).162  
 
The WTO is a member-driven international organisation, composed of governments and 
customs territories, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations. 
Documents deriving from the WTO provide the legal ground rules for international 
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commerce.163 The core objective of the WTO, rendered in the GATT, is to open up the global 
market for trade and introduce a trade flow as freely as possible. The GATT is a fundamental 
multilateral agreement, which governs trade in goods and therefore also trade in gas.164 
Additionally, another important agreement deriving from the WTO is the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), which includes service provisions within energy related matters 
such as transmission and distribution of energy. The GATS will however, not be covered 
further in this thesis since the main focus is related to trade in gas following the theory of 
safeguarding energy supply. The UK currently participates in the WTO through its 
membership in the EU, and it is likely that the UK post-withdrawal will commit to the WTO 
as a signatory in its own right, due to the coverage that the WTO has worldwide. As the UK is 
a consumer of gas, and imports a large share of gas yearly, it is important that the UK protects 
itself from trade barriers in the gas market.  
 
Furthermore, another multilateral treaty of importance for energy matters is the ECT. There is 
a close link between the ECT and the energy-related provisions in the GATT. The GATT has 
been considered as the relevant body for trade in energy goods even though many trade 
provisions are copied into the ECT.165 However, provisions in the GATT cannot be applied to 
energy trade outright as the unique characteristics of energy trade necessitate special attention 
in interpreting the relevant laws and regulations. Applying the GATT will enhance the 
removal of obstacles to trade in the energy market, however the ECT as a sector specific 
legislative framework needs to be enforced for a full covered compliance in the field of 
energy. Therefore the ECT, together with the GATT, imposes positive measures such as the 
constructions of interconnected pipelines and harmonisation of transmission standards.166  
 
5.2.2.1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
5.2.2.1.1. Trade in Gas  
Article I:1 of the GATT sets forth one of the main concepts of a multilateral trade system, 
namely the Most Favoured Nation principle (MFN). This principle states that Member States 
of the WTO are obliged to extend any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted to 
any product (energy products included) originating in or destined from any country, to the 
like products167 originating in or destined from the territories of all other Member States of 
the WTO. The same provision initiates that the MFN clause applies to custom duties and 
charges imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation, as well as charges 
imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to 
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the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation and exportation.168  
 
Another fundamental principle for the cooperation within the WTO is the national treatment 
principle, which prescribes that import of products (energy products included) should be 
treated similar to like domestic products according to Article III:1 of the GATT. The principle 
therefore strengthens the non-discriminatory behaviour in the market. The MFN principle and 
the national treatment principle are enforced to avoid that like products (energy products 
included) and materials are discriminated against, on the basis of their origin (imports) or 
destination (exports).169 These provisions will guarantee that the UK will be treated in a non-
discriminatory way and therefore fairly to its competitors when trading gas in the market.  
 
Furthermore, another provision of importance, conferred in Article XI of the GATT, prohibits 
Member States to impose quantitative restrictions, such as, bans, quotas or licenses or other 
measure with equivalent effect. This provision is relevant for the trade in energy products, and 
applies to importation and exportation of energy products to avoid discriminatory 
treatment.170 Discriminatory treatment is a factor that can impede the secure supply of energy, 
because the result of such conduct poses an obstacle for countries to trade in energy. These 
principles, banning discriminatory behaviour, are therefore of fundamental value for the UK 
when seeking to secure the supply of gas.    
 
5.2.2.1.2. The Transit of Gas  
Transit rules are also of significant importance for energy trade, because energy is difficult to 
transport and store (see section 2.3.2 and 2.3.4). Transportation of gas, presented in section 
2.3.2 is mainly achieved through pipelines or by cargoes, and Article V of the GATT provides 
for the freedom of transit. Yulia Selivanova defines gas transit as gas originating in one 
country (exporter), transits at least one, second country (transit country), and then enters into 
the destination country (importer).171 The transit provision in GATT guarantees the freedom 
of transit through the territory of each Member State and therefore reduces the risk of a 
shortage in gas supplies. Former gas disruptions, e.g. the Russia-Ukraine crisis, demonstrate 
the importance of a provision that guarantees gas to be transited to the final destination. 
Russia currently provides the EU with most of its gas, and gas entering the UK from 
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5.2.2.2. The Energy Charter Treaty  
5.2.2.2.1. The Liberalised International Energy Market  
Due to the high dependence of Europe on external sources of energy, it was imperative to 
create a legal framework through which the EU’s relations with important energy producing 
and transit countries were designed. The ECT was first introduced to guarantee Europe’s 
external security of energy supply and it has been stated that the implementation of the ECT 
in the EU plays an important role in the future to secure the supply of energy (and in 
particular secure the supply of gas).172 The Charter establishes a framework for international 
cooperation between European Countries and other industrialised countries with the aim of 
developing the energy required and of ensuring security of energy supply.173 The ultimate 
objective of the ECT is to create a liberalised energy market across borders and assure the 
legal framework required to enhance energy trade. This in turn contributes to the liberalisation 
of the global energy market through the adoption of WTO rules.174 
 
5.2.2.2.2. Energy Security  
Article 2 of the ECT specifies the objective of the ECT as to establish a legal framework in 
order to promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based on complementarities and 
mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter. These 
principles include inter alia energy security.175 The ECT creates, in accordance with the 
objective of energy security, a unique structure for energy cooperation and if applied 
efficiently it has the opportunity to create increased security of supply for importing countries 
and economic development for exporting countries.176 To ensure this, the Charter includes 
provisions to govern trade in energy products, enhance the freedom of transit, protect and 
promote investment in infrastructure and establish a dispute settlement mechanism.177 
 
5.2.2.2.3. Trade in Gas  
The ECT is the energy-specific multilateral instrument that was introduced to avoid hindrance 
and discrimination in the trade of energy products based on WTO rules. To secure a fair trade 
in energy products the ECT incorporates the MFN principle and the national treatment 
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principle in Article 29(2)(a) of the ECT, which derive from equivalent provisions in the 
GATT.178  
 
5.2.2.2.4. The Transit of Gas  
The goal to achieve free energy trade was suppose to secure energy supplies to countries that 
were landlocked or highly dependent on one single supplier. To accomplish this, the ECT 
adopted the transit provision introduced in the GATT, since fair and strong transit facilities 
would help to mitigate some of the problems that countries might face.179 The transit 
provision expressly prohibits interference and requires a secure flow of gas (Article 7.5 of the 
ECT).180 
 
5.2.2.2.5. The Investment Regime  
One of the major concepts of energy security is the access to energy reserves (see section 2.2). 
Investment in infrastructure is therefore considered important to build the necessary structures 
and to maintain already existing structures. This in turn can contribute to the unrestricted flow 
of gas.181 The contribution to adequate infrastructure requires investment, and the ECT 
therefore governs the conditions under which investments in the energy sector can be done 
with minimum risk in accordance with fair and equitable treatment, protection from 
unreasonable or discriminatory treatment, protection under the national treatment principle 
and the MFN principle (Article 10 of the ECT).  
 
5.2.3. The Outcome of the Bilateral and the Multilateral Agreements  
Important bilateral agreements to negotiate with third countries (excluded the EU and its 
Member States), as well as multilateral agreements to commit to for the UK’s secure supply 
of gas post-withdrawal, have been presented throughout section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.  
 
With no post-withdrawal agreement addressing energy security matters between the EU and 
the UK, the UK might need to negotiate bilateral agreements and/or commit to multilateral 
trade and energy frameworks to secure its supply of natural gas. As mentioned in section 5.2.2 
bilateral agreements can assist multilateral commitments by stabilising relations between 
domestic and foreign gas companies/governments.  
 
Through bilateral energy dialogues the UK can regulate energy security matters with 
countries of interest, while the accessibility of gas could be ensured through bilateral supply 
agreements. The latter would be concluded between UK gas companies and foreign gas 
companies/governments. Bilateral supply agreements can either be concluded with exporters 
of liquefied gas (in the LNG market) or with exporters of dry gas (in the pipeline market). 																																																								
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Accordingly, the UK would access a variety of exporters, diversifying its gas routes (see 
section 3.2.4 presenting the importance of diversified gas routes for the secure supply of gas).  
 
However, in case of political instability (e.g. the Russia-Ukraine crisis) or disputes between 
gas trading partners, bilateral agreements seems to fall short in ensuring a secure supply of 
gas. Mentioned risks can lead to unfair restrictions imposed on gas trade with the UK, and 
without enforcement mechanisms to counteract such action, bilateral agreements seems to fall 
short. In contrast, multilateral agreements can assist the UK by banning unfair trade 
restrictions and bring the parties to a settlement. Negotiating bilateral agreements can 
accordingly benefit the UK post-withdrawal as such agreements would diversify gas routes 
and allow access to gas reserves, but in case of discriminatory actions taken towards the UK, 
it would have little to set against such actions without a multilateral framework to fall back 
on.  
 
Because of UK’s geographical location and international cooperation through the EU, it 
would be natural for the UK to continue its participation in the WTO and adopt the GATT, as 
well as become a signatory party in its own right to the ECT. These multilateral agreements 
will together with bilateral supply agreements, safeguard a diversified trade in gas by 
providing an obstacle-free market with protection against discriminatory behaviour conducted 
by market actors. Accordingly, the GATT and the ECT consist significant measures to 
safeguard the supply of gas for its signatory parties, as these multilateral frameworks provide 
for the MFN clause, the national treatment principle and the prohibition on imposing 
quantitative restrictions. Furthermore, this would guarantee that participating states do not 
impose higher tariffs on trade with the UK than on trade with other participating states, 
ensuring that the UK’s imports of gas are not subjected to unreasonable tariffs. Thus allowing 
the UK to supply affordable gas for its end consumers (see section 2.2 presenting affordability 
as a requirement for energy security). Additionally, the transit provision in the GATT and the 
sector specific ECT ensures that gas can be traded across borders without being subject to 
obstacles during its transit, which benefits the UK as it is importing a large share of gas 
yearly.   
 
If the UK undertake a unilateral withdrawal it would be required to re-establish customs 
controls at its borders. Gas trade between the UK and the EU would be governed by the 
WTO’s rules, and the UK would face European external tariffs, and vice versa.182 Although 
the UK would be ensured non-discriminatory access to gas markets of participating states, the 
UK would not benefit from preferential access to specific gas markets if not negotiating such 
access. Considering the fact that the UK is highly dependent on gas imports from continental 
Europe, an option with preferential market access in gas trade might be preferable. 
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Additionally it must be noted that the WTO has a poor record of lifting barriers to trade, 
mainly because of its lack of enforcement mechanisms.183 
 
Furthermore, the bilateral- and multilateral approach might impose a risk for the UK’s secure 
supply of gas post-withdrawal since trade in gas between the UK and a non-participating state 
of the GATT and/or the ECT would result in no protection under these treaties. Accordingly 
the UK would gain no protection against discriminatory behaviour or imposed trade 
restrictions in the gas market under these treaties. The largest reserve holders of natural gas in 
2015 were the following countries presented in figure 2. 
 
 
© U.S. Energy Information and Administration (EIA) 2015 
Figure 2. Top 10 natural gas proved reserves holders (by trillion cubic feet)184 
 
These countries hold the largest reserves of gas in the world and are therefore countries of 
interest to trade gas with. However, most of these countries are not participating in the WTO 
and/or the ECT (see figure 3 for the WTO and figure 4 for the ECT).  
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© World Trade Organisation (WTO) 2016 
Figure 3. World Trade Organisation membership and accession status185 	
 
© Jones Day Publications 2015 
Figure 4. Energy Charter Treaty Ratification186 
 																																																								
185 World Trade Organisation. WTO Accession Map. 2016. Chart: WTO Accession Map [online] 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_map_e.htm> (Retrieved 2016-10-01) 
186 Jones Day Publications. International Remedies for Foreign Investors in Bulgaria’s Renewable Energy 
Sector. 2015. Chart: Energy Charter Treaty Ratification <http://www.jonesday.com/international-remedies-for-
foreign-investors-in-bulgarias-renewable-energy-sector-09-11-2015/> (Retrieved 2016-10-01). 
	 51	
Another important factor mentionable is that a unilateral withdrawal could result in 
insecurities among actors in the energy market during the transposition time. In the long-term 
it would be wise of the UK to negotiate bilateral agreements and commit to multilateral 
agreements, as this would provide the UK with legislative measures to safeguard the supply 
of gas.  
 
5.3. Self-sufficiency in Gas Supplies  
In terms of trade, there are around 160 countries in the world, which trade with neighbouring 
countries quit happily without being a part of an economic bloc. The UK could, following this 
example, commit to no preferential agreement at all regarding energy related matters and 
energy security. Optimal for such arrangement would be if the UK were self-sufficient in its 
gas supplies, which will now be examined.  
 
There is no exaggeration in saying that UK’s society is based on a high-energy consumption 
and that the everyday function would be brought to halt if energy were too costly or 
unavailable. Thus, crucial political issues are the secure access to energy and the possibility to 
provide the demanded domestic share. This section will therefore examine whether the UK is 
self-sufficient, or could become self-sufficient in its gas supplies. This would namely exclude 
the need for the UK to rely on actors exporting gas to UK. To evaluate UK’s self-sufficiency 
three questions needs to be asked. (i) Does the UK use gas in its energy consumption? (ii) 
Does the UK produce gas domestically? (iii) What are the political consequences of the first 
two questions? 
 
When these questions have been answered and evaluated I can state whether the UK is 
currently considered or could become self-sufficient in its gas supplies, as well as what the 
implications of this might be.  
 
5.3.1. Does the UK Use Gas in its Energy Consumption? 
The UK is one of the largest natural gas consumers in the EU,187 mentioned throughout this 
thesis. Because of the consumption levels of natural gas in the UK, gas is an important source 
in the total energy mix.188  
 
5.3.2. Does the UK Produce Gas Domestically?  
The UK produces around 40 per cent of its current domestic gas use through productions in 
the North Sea and the Irish Sea. The rest is, however imported from continental Europe and 
Norway, or LNG is shipped in from around the world.189  
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5.3.3. What are the Political Consequences?  
As the UK is considered a large gas consumer, and do not produce enough gas domestically 
there is a significant need for the UK to safeguard the supply of natural gas through imports. 
However, not only the UK, but also other countries worldwide are highly dependent on gas 
imports.190 This creates an on-going competition over gas reserves. One of the main concerns 
are that there are more countries importing gas in relation to countries exporting gas, which 
contributes to an evolving competition on access to gas. There is a stated risk that gas exports 
might gradually shift direction from the west (e.g. Europe) to the East, because of the 
increasing dependence on natural gas that there is. China, India and other Asian markets are 
growing economically and economic growth demands sufficient energy sources, and in 
particular gas.191  
 
The answer to the questions asked above presents that the UK is not currently self-sufficient 
in its gas supply. However, to be able to safeguard the supply of gas in the future there might 
be a need for the UK to increase the availability of gas, by developing the exploration in its 
own gas production. Next section will address the UK’s possibility to become self-sufficient in 
its gas supply.  
 
5.3.3.1. Undiscovered Gas and Unconventional Production of Gas  
Due to declining production of gas in the North Sea, the UK is exploring other areas of 
interest for domestic production. The UK therefore explores locations around the Shetland 
Islands where reserves have been found to cover a large share of domestic demand.192   
 
Additionally the UK is about to explore its shale gas production. The UK adopted the ‘Energy 
Act of 2013’, which mainly regulates the development of a nuclear programme, but also 
includes legislation for developing unconventional oil and gas (shale gas). 193  New 
technologies have made it possible to extract gas from shale rock formations and the 
development is called ‘fracking’. The result from the extraction has been astonishing, and is 
seen as a major opportunity in many countries, while in other countries a contentious issue.194  
 
The on-going shale gas revolution has affected the market today, and is estimated to play an 
important part of the future production in gas.195 It is anticipated that unconventional gas will 
account for nearly half of the expected increase in global gas production to 2035. This is due 
to technological advances, which allows cheaper extraction. The development of cheaper 
techniques to extract methane from hydrates could give a manifold increase in exploitable gas 																																																								
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reserves worldwide.196 The UK however, is struggling to get an operational shale gas sector 
owing to local stakeholders being against shale gas drilling. It is appealing to the UK to open 
up for shale gas exploration due to the declining production of natural gas in the North Sea 
and the expectations on shale gas to yield more gas. In fact, the UK government recently 
approved shale gas extraction in Lancashire and it is the first time a UK shale rock will be 
fracked horizontally.197 Yet, the project is highly opposite by many. Shale gas projects are 
relatively new and the research into their environmental effects is not yet sufficient. Current 
legal framework is rather reactive than proactive towards shale gas and needs an update to 
meet safety and environmental concerns.198  
 
The shale gas revolution in the US might have been an additional factor that influenced the 
UK Government to shift towards a more prominent role of gas in the UK’s energy strategy. 
Shale gas exploration in the US led to lower gas prices and fewer carbon dioxide emissions 
through the displacement of sources like coal in the power sector.199 While now being 
extracted in the US, and soon to be in the UK, it can be noted that it has been banned in for 
example France. Some countries in the EU is expected to hold large reserves of shale gas, like 
Poland, France and the UK, which could eventually contribute to the enhancement of energy 
security; in particular in the UK.  
 
5.4. The Outcome of the Hard Brexit  
The goal for the UK, presented in section 2.4, is to adopt legislative measures safeguarding 
the supply of gas post-Brexit. This section is devoted to deliver the outcome of the ‘hard’ 
Brexit with the options of bilateral- and multilateral agreements, as well as the possibility to 
be self-sufficient.  
 
If undiscovered resources are to be located by the UK around the Shetland Islands and the 
development in the shale gas extraction succeeds, the UK could become less reliant on gas 
imports to cover its demand. Once the UK’s membership in the EU is terminated the need to 
secure the supply of gas will be a question for the UK to regulate individually, if it were not to 
proceed with a preferential relationship with the EU examined further in chapter six. If the 
UK were to become self-sufficient in its supply of gas it would exclude the need for the UK to 
negotiate bilateral supply agreements and to commit to multilateral legislative frameworks for 
the sake of gas trade. However, since it is nearly impossible to estimate a country’s future gas 
reserves, with a specification on how much gas that can be produced, this option provides a 
very insecure future for the UK. The insecurities around whether the shale gas exploration 
will succeed or whether there are undiscovered locations for natural gas, together with the 																																																								
196 Roberts, Peter and Maalouf, Ruchdi. Contractual Issues in the International Gas Trade: LNG – the Key to the 
Golden Age of Gas. In Research Handbook on International Energy Law, Talus, Kim (ed.), p. 329-358. Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 2014. p. 330.  
197 BBC News. Fracking in Lancashire Given Go-ahead by Government. 2016-10-06  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-lancashire-37567866> (Retrieved 2016-11-14).  
198 Heffron, Raphael J. Energy Law: An Introduction. Springer, 2014, p. 44-45.  
199 Kopp, Sandu-Daniel. Politics, Markets and EU Gas Supply Security: Case Studies of the UK and Germany. 
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015, p. 149-150 
	 54	
declining gas production in the North Sea, therefore puts pressure on the UK Government to 
find a long-term solution safeguarding access to gas. One of the key elements presented in 
section 2.2 is the availability of gas, and this requirement cannot yet be achieved by the 
domestic production of gas in the UK, since it is still highly dependent on imports of gas.  
 
The analysis in this chapter provides that the UK is not self-sufficient in its gas supply to date, 
which stresses the need for the UK to safeguard imports of gas. To achieve a constant supply 
of gas to the UK, it needs to import gas. These trade relations should be subjected to some 
level of protection against discriminatory behaviour among actors in the gas market. This can 
be achieved, to some extent, through bilateral- and multilateral trade and energy agreements 
as discussed in section 5.2.3, which presents the outcome of the bilateral- and multilateral 
agreements.  
 
5.4.1. The UK Guaranteeing Gas Security Individually  
The UK could trade in the gas market without participating in regional and/or multilateral 
collaborations, as the UK could choose to regulate energy matters individually, relying on the 
market without overriding rules governing conducts taken by the UK in the gas market. Some 
countries address the secure supply of natural gas regionally as the EU’s Member States 
(currently including the UK), while some countries address the secure supply of natural gas 
individually.  
 
With the UK currently being a large consumer of gas, energy security is a key energy policy 
goal. 200  The importance of guaranteeing gas supplies justifies some degree of legal 
regulation, as well as economic and political speculations to organise activities among the 
actors involved in the market. Consumers, both industry and private, might be unaware or 
negligent about the effects of their choices on the overall gas security of the community they 
live in. Some measures must therefore be designed to regulate their choices.201 Arguably, the 
UK has to regulate the secure supply of gas individually since its current legislative 
framework governing the secure supply of gas will be terminated due to its withdrawal. This 
is the case even though the UK would negotiate bilateral agreements and/or commit to 
multilateral trade and energy agreements, as well as becoming self-sufficient in domestic gas 
supplies.  
 
Whether the UK is suitable to regulate its energy security matters individually is a difficult 
question to answer. Some energy experts argue that the task of formulating policy governing 
the secure supply of gas is better achieved by national governments. Other energy experts, in 
line with the EU’s energy security approach, argue that the secure supply of gas policy is 
better achieved at a regional level. Energy experts pro national-regulation, consider national 
governments suitable to address gas security questions, due to its familiarity with its own 
specific gas market. On the contrary energy experts pro regional-regulation argues that with 																																																								
200 Heffron, Raphael J. Energy Law: An Introduction. Springer, 2014, p. 44-45. 
201 Haghighi, Sanam Salem Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major 
Oil and Gas Supplying Countries. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007. p. 2.  
	 55	
the developed liberalised energy market, gas security questions require a broader operation at 
a higher level. This argument is based on the fact that a failure to adopt adequate national 
measures in one country can have serious consequences for neighbouring countries, but also 
for the energy market as a whole. Accordingly, it is undesirable if broader necessary measures 
were undertaken by one state alone (see section 3.3.3.4).202 
 
It is easy to look inwards when it comes to fundamental interests for the domestic gas needs. 
However, there is a well-integrated market outside UK borders and there is a well-integrated 
market outside EU borders. This is important to consider when examining energy security. 
The gas market has moved from a national market, to a regional market, with few, if any 
borders.203 It has therefore been recognised by many energy experts that while Member States 
of the EU were once considered as the best authorities to guarantee internal gas security, this 
competence has shifted towards a regional level.204 
 
Although some experts believe that national public bodies are best placed to ensure the supply 
of gas, other experts believe that gas supply is best left to a higher level (e.g. EU level). As 
the UK is not yet self-sufficient in its gas supplies, and trade in gas has become regional and 
fairly international, it is important to examine whether the UK could continue its 
participation in the current legal framework safeguarding gas security (the UK’s current 
energy legislation safeguarding the supply of gas is presented in chapter three). Next chapter 
will therefore examine what existing available options there are, for the UK post-withdrawal, 
to negotiate further cooperation with the EU on gas security matters.   
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6. Negotiated Withdrawal  
6.1. Introduction 
It is presumed that the IEM and the regulations thereto, are of significant importance for the 
UK’s ability to safeguard the supply of gas (see chapter three). This is a factor that the UK 
Government needs to take into consideration when entering negotiations with the EU 
regarding the potential future relationship between the parties. In contrast to chapter five 
examining the ‘hard’ Brexit, this chapter will examine the ‘soft’ and the ‘grey’ Brexit by 
studying existing options negotiable between the UK and the EU.  
 
To achieve preferential access to the IEM, and the regulations thereto, the withdrawal 
agreement negotiated between the UK on the one hand, and the EU and its Member States on 
the other hand, needs to address this matter. There are different options for the UK in 
negotiating such access, and these negotiable existing options will be evaluated below. 
 
6.2. Bilateral And Multilateral Aspects of the European Union’s External Energy 
Policy  
To be able to examine different existing available options that the UK can negotiate with the 
EU post-withdrawal, the EU’s external energy policy needs to be examined first.  
 
The EU primarily uses treaties to pursue its energy goals. Treaties establish a network of legal 
obligations and procedures with its partner countries. The EU’s legal personality is expressed 
in Article 47 of the TEU, which entails that the EU acts as a state-like actor in international 
commitments. This means that the EU can conclude international agreements, but under the 
surveillance of the Council of Ministers in accordance with Article 218 of the TFEU (Article 
207 of the TFEU regulates the common commercial policy). The EU’s external competence is 
based either upon the explicit authority of the Treaty or upon the external manifestation of 
internal powers.205 The competence to conclude international agreements is given to the EU 
under Article 216(1) of the TFEU, which allows for action if it is required to pursue one of 
the objectives set forward by the Union.206  
 
Energy is subject to the shared competence of the EU, which was presented in section 3.3. 
Natural gas however is a good, which is subject to trade, and can therefore fall within the 
scope of the Common Commercial Policy in Article 207 of the TFEU. The Common 
Commercial Policy is an exclusive competence expressed in Article 3(3) of the TFEU, which 
means that Member States cannot enter into international agreements themselves.  
 
6.2.1. Bilateral Agreements  
The EU aims to remove obstacles to trade, and tackle challenges that get in the way of trade 
with other countries, by negotiating bilateral agreements. Depending on the agreement, 
partner governments in other parts of the world omit to a series of measures. There are three 
main types of agreements, divided into the following categories:  																																																								
205 Referred to as internal and external parallelism.  
206 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 219.  
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(i) Customs Unions, which eliminates customs duties in bilateral trade and establishes 
a joint customs tariff for foreign importers. 
(ii) Association Agreements, Stabilisation Agreements, (Deep and Comprehensive) 
Free Trade Agreements and Economic Partnership Agreements, which removes or 
reduces customs tariffs in bilateral trade.  
(iii) Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, which provides a general framework for 
bilateral economic relations without eliminating or reducing customs tariffs.207 
 
Agreements precluded as an economic cooperation have no specific energy focus, although 
energy may be mentioned as an object of development aid, included in a customs union and 
the adoption of EU law. Associated agreements on the other hand, are special cases where the 
EU is given the competence to conclude agreements establishing an association with both 
third countries and international organisations by the Treaty of Rome.208 Despite no formal 
definition of the objectives and the scope of these associations, the EU has used this 
competence over the years to conclude associations with a large number of countries for very 
different reasons and objectives.209 Article 217 of the TFEU expresses that an association can 
be established involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and special 
procedures. This suggests that association agreements can be concluded to cover all areas 
where the EU is involved with its legislative measures.210 Kim Talus presents that Gracia 
Marin Duran and Elisa Morgera distinguish between four categories of association:  
 
“Association as a prelude to EU membership (as is currently the case with Turkey and 
certain South-Eastern European countries); association as a substitute for EU 
membership (as is currently the case with Norway and the countries in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership); association as a development tool (as is the Cotonou 
Agreement); and association as an instrument for inter-regional cooperation (e.g. the 
association agreements with Chile and South Africa).”211     
 
Another bilateral agreement type is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in category 
(iii). These agreements provide a basis for economic and trade policy dialogue. One country 
where the EU has concluded such an agreement is with Russia, mainly because of its gas 
supplies to the European continent.212 
 
																																																								
207 European Commission. Trade Agreements. 2016 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/agreements/index_en.htm> (Retrieved 2016-11-18).  
208 The Treaty of Rome was signed 1957 in Rome by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. The 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC).   
209 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 226.  
210 Similarly see Marin Duran, Gracia and Morgera, Elisa. Environmental Integration in the EU’s External 
Relations: Beyond Multilateral Dimensions. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 60.  
211 Marin Duran, Gracia and Morgera, Elisa. Environmental Integration in the EU’s External Relations: Beyond 
Multilateral Dimensions. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 58-59. In: Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: 
A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 226.  
212 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 229.  
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Eminent for the discussion on post-Brexit scenarios is Article 8 of the TEU, which expresses 
that the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries. The objective 
is to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness founded on the values of the 
EU, which is highly relevant for the UK when entering into the withdrawal negotiation with 
the EU.  
 
6.2.2. Multilateral Agreements  
Multilateral cooperation has been assessed in chapter five, but a collaboration of interest when 
examining the European external energy policy in this chapter, is the Energy Community 
presented in section 3.2.3 The Community objective is to extend the EU’s IEM to 
neighbouring countries by exporting EU energy law, enhancing cooperation within energy 
matters and securing the supply of natural gas.213 This cooperation will be assessed later on in 
this chapter, as an option for the UK, besides the agreement types presented above.  
 
6.2.3. Agreements Concluded Between the EU and Third Countries 
The introduction has now presented the legal basis for the EU’s external energy policy. Based 
on the facts introduced above, the next section will evaluate existing relations that the EU has 
with third countries, as these relations may serve as a blueprint for potential options for EU-
UK relation post-Brexit on gas security. The variety of countries selected cover the wide 
range of different relationship from deep-rooted relationships to loosely coupled relations. 
When these agreements have been identified, an examination of the access to the IEM will be 
undertaken, and each agreements energy security policy will be considered. Following 
countries collaboration with the EU will be examined:  
 
(i) Norway 
(ii) Switzerland  
(iii) Turkey  
(iv) Canada 
(v) Albania  
 
6.3. The Norwegian Model   
6.3.1. Introduction  
The relationship between the EU and Norway falls within category (ii) of the main types of 
agreements mentioned under bilateral agreements in section 6.2.1. Gracia Marin Duran and 
Elisa Morgera identify this relationship as an association agreement and the legal basis is 
provided in Article 217 of the TFEU.  
 
6.3.2. European Economic Area and the European Free Trade Association  
Norway is a Member State in the European Economic Area (EEA), which is an 
intergovernmental organisation governed by the Agreement on the European Economic Area 
																																																								
213 Decision No 2006/500/EC, of the Council of 29 May 2006 on the conclusion by the European Community of 
the Energy Community Treaty [2006] OJ L 335.  
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(the EEA Agreement). 214  Seven countries, which were not members of the European 
Community in 1961215 – Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Austria and Portugal 
– established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), with a later membership 
accession of Iceland. This Association gradually decreased in size over the years as some of 
the Member States left the Association to become members in the EU instead. The remaining 
Member States of the EFTA however decided to continue its collaboration by focusing on 
concluding a future free trade agreement with the EU.216  
 
The Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association (the Convention)217 forms 
the legal basis of the EFTA organisation and governs free trade relations between the Member 
States of Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein. The EFTA constitutes a free trade 
agreement between mentioned countries, and liberalisation under such an agreement is 
traditionally broad in scope and run deep in terms of the level of commitments undertaken.218 
Article 2 of the Convention expresses the fundamental objectives of the Association as, the 
promotion of a continued and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between 
the Member States, free trade in goods, a progressively liberalised free movement of persons, 
a progressive development in the free movement of services and investment, fair conditions 
for competition, the opening up of a public procurement market of the Member States and the 
need for appropriate protection of intellectual property. The objective of the EFTA is to 
contribute to the expansion of trade globally, which is done through the management of the 
EFTA Convention (intra-EFTA trade), the EEA Agreement (EFTA-EU relations) and the 
EFTA Free Trade Agreements (third country relations). The Association has concluded many 
free trade agreements with third countries, which has enhanced the trade regime in the 
cooperation. This cooperation also led to the EEA Agreement, which enabled three of four 
EFTA Member States to access the European internal market.219  
 
In 1991 the EEA was signed and entered into force the 1 of January 1994.220 The EEA 
cooperation brings together EU Member States and three of four Member States of the EFTA 
– namely Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein – in the internal market. The EEA goes beyond 
traditional free trade agreements by extending the full rights and obligations of the EU’s 																																																								
214 Agreement on the European Economic Area of 17 March 1997. OJ L NO L 1, 3.1.1994.  
215 The European Community was the economic and political organisation formed from the consolidation of 
three European treaty organisations: the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steal 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The European Community was later integrated to the 
European Union [Hereinafter referred to as the European Union (EU)]. For a deeper understanding see European 
Union. A Europe Without Frontiers. 2016 <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1990-1999_en> 
(Retrieved 2016-11-20).  
216 Haghighi, Sanam. Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and 
Gas Supplying Countries. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 109-110.  
217 Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association of 1 July 2013. Rue de Varembé, Geneva. 
218 Evans, David. Bilateral and Plurilateral.  PTAs. In Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements. Lester, Simon 
and Mercurio, Bryan (ed.), p. 52-77. Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 52-54.   
219 European Free Trade Association. The European Free Trade Association. <http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-
agreement> (Retrieved 2016-10-02). 
220 Haghighi, Sanam. Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and 
Gas Supplying Countries. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 109-110.  
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internal market to the EFTA countries (with the exception of Switzerland, which will be 
examined further in section 6.4).221 The EEA Agreement provides for the inclusion of EU 
legislation covering the four freedoms – the free movement of goods, services, persons and 
capital – throughout the 31 EEA States. In addition, the Agreement covers cooperation in 
important areas such as energy, environmental and social policy, as well as ensuring that 
competition is not distorted (Article 2 of the EEA Agreement). The objective of the EEA 
Agreement is to guarantee equal rights and obligations within the internal market for 
economic operators and citizens of the EEA. The Agreement provides that certain areas are 
exempted from EU legislation such as agricultural, fisheries, customs union, common foreign 
and security policy, monetary union and common trade policy.222 In contrast to the EU, the 
EEA is not a customs union but constitutes a free trade area. Norway, Iceland and 
Lichtenstein are not parties to any of the third-country agreements that the EU has concluded 
through its Member States, but instead bound by third-country agreements concluded through 
the EFTA.223 
 
6.3.2.1. Incorporation of European Union Legislation  
The objective of the EEA is to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and 
economic relationship between the Contracting Parties224 according to Article 1 of the EEA 
Agreement. The Contracting Parties must strive to ensure that the rules are actually or 
presumably interpreted in the same manner and in conformity with EU legislation. 
Accordingly where the scope of the provision is the same, ruling from the European Court of 
Justice should be applied in EEA law (Article 6 of the EEA Agreement).225 After the internal 
market legislation has been extended to the EEA/EFTA countries, the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority and the EFTA Court monitor transposition and application. The EEA Joint 
Committee shall ensure the effective implementation of EU legislation in areas covered by the 
EEA Agreement.226  
 
6.3.2.2. Access to the Internal Energy Market  
Norway is much like a EU Member State despite its earlier negative referendums regarding 
the accession to the EU (held in 1972 and 1994).227 One of the main objectives of the EEA 																																																								
221 European Parliament. The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North. 2016. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.3.html> (Retrieved 2016-10-
10).  
222 European Free Trade Association. EEA Agreement. <http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement> (Retrieved 
2016-10-02).  
223 Compare provisions in the EEA Agreement and Article 28 of the TFEU.  
224 Defined in Article 2(c) of the EEA Agreement as the Community and the EC Member States, or the 
Community, or the EC Member States. 
225 Referred to as the ’Principle of Homogeneity’ 
226 The legal effect of EU law, and the way in which it should be implemented in the EEA (EFTA) countries, is 
to be found in the Annexes attached to the EEA Agreement. For a deeper understanding see European Economic 
Area. How EU Acts Become EEA Acts and the Need for Adaptions. 2013. 
<http://www.efta.int/media/documents/eea/1113623-How-EU-acts-become-EEA-acts.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-11-
19).  
227 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 232.  
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was held to be the access to the internal market, and this is now guaranteed in Article 2 of the 
EEA Agreement.  
 
Norway has always been an important supplier of natural gas for the EU, and it was therefore 
of vital importance to allow Norway access to the IEM. This would provide for the secure 
supply of natural gas from Norway to the EU, by introducing internal market measures such 
as the free movement provisions and EU competition law.228 
 
Article 24 of the EEA Agreement refers to Annex IV, which contains specific provisions on 
energy-related matters. This provision forms the foundation of the EU energy law now 
adopted in Norway. As Norway has to incorporate EU energy law as it evolves, it is under the 
obligation to implement IEM legislation,229 guaranteeing access to the IEM.  
 
6.3.2.3. Energy Security  
The EEA/EFTA countries have now adopted the majority of EU legislation concerning the 
energy sector. For the purpose of abundance natural gas reserves in Norway, one of the most 
important actions was the adoption of the Gas Directive in the EEA. Today, both the Third 
Energy Package and the Security of Gas Supply Regulation are legislative frameworks with 
EEA relevance. The European energy legislation presented in chapter three is therefore as 
relevant for Norway, as for any other Member State of the EU.  
 
6.3.2.4. The Process of Decision-making  
The design of the EEA allows Norway to participate in the internal market, without the full 
responsibilities of EU membership. The constitution provides that as EU legislation evolves, 
Norway has to adopt relevant provisions. However, as Norway is only allowed to take part as 
a consultant party in the beginning of the law drafting, it has to adopt legislation without 
taking part in the decision-making (Norway is not allowed to vote in specific matters even 
though the regulation about to be adopted concerns it). Accordingly, Norway has to adopt 
legislative frameworks with EEA relevance without comprehensive participation.230 This is 
not only the case with energy security measures, but also applicable for a wider range of 
arrangements (see section 6.3.2.1).   
 
6.3.3. The Norwegian Model Applied to the UK  
Norway as an EEA/EFTA State takes part in the IEM and adopts regulations thereto, and if 
the UK were to negotiate this arrangement with the EU, it would continue to access the IEM 
and adopt regulations thereto. The Norwegian model as a post-withdrawal option for the UK 
therefore results in similar energy arrangements as status quo. The vast majority of energy-
related legislation is texts with EEA relevance, meaning that the UK would be under the 
obligation to adopt both the Gas Directive and the Security of Gas Supply Regulation, which 																																																								
228 Haghighi, Sanam. Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and 
Gas Supplying Countries. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 109-110. 
229 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 213.  
230 Haghighi, Sanam. Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and 
Gas Supplying Countries. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 109-110. 
	 62	
is recognised as the two fundamental regulations drafted by the EU in order to safeguard the 
supply of gas in the EU (see chapter three).  
 
Another fundamental change for the UK within its energy security regime is that if the UK 
sought to become a Member State in the EEA/EFTA, it would have to apply a substantial 
portion of energy legislation with just a minimal level of influence regarding the legislation’s 
content. This is referred to as ‘democratic deficit’,231 and under this option the UK would 
therefore only participate in the consultative part of the drafting progress within energy 
related matters. Essentially after a provision regarding energy security has passed, or any 
other provision with EEA relevance, the UK would have to pass the provision without the 
right to vote on it, which would leave the UK with less saying over rules regarding its security 
of gas supply.232 
 
6.4. The Swiss Model  
6.4.1. Introduction  
The relationship between the EU and Switzerland does not fall within any of the categories 
presented in section 6.2.1 for bilateral agreements, or for multilateral agreements in section 
6.2.2. Instead, the Swiss relationship with the EU rests on individual bilateral trade 
agreements negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The legal base for the Swiss-EU cooperation 
is the Insurance Agreement of 1989, Bilateral Agreements I of 1999 and Bilateral Agreements 
II of 2004.233 Switzerland is also a Member State of the EFTA, but not a member of the EEA.  
 
6.4.2. Bilateral Agreements and the European Free Trade Association 
Switzerland is as mentioned a Member State of the EFTA, however the EFTA has already 
been examined under the Norwegian model, and will therefore only be mentioned briefly in 
this section. As an EFTA member, Switzerland took part in the negotiations of the EEA 
Agreement, which it signed in May 1992. Immediately after that, the Swiss Government 
submitted an application for accession to the EU. However, following the referendum held in 
the end of 1992 that yielded a vote against participating in the EEA and the EU, the Swiss 
Federal Council stopped pursuing the country’s EEA and EU membership.234  
 
Since then, Switzerland has retained observer status within the EEA and developed its 
relations with the EU through bilateral agreements in areas of mutual interest. Following the 																																																								
231 Democratic deficit is defined as an insufficient level of democracy in political institutions and procedures in 
comparison with a theoretical ideal of a democratic government. Evaluations of the level of democratic deficit 
focus on the procedural aspects of democracy, reflected in the mechanisms of representation and decision-
making. The concept is most often used in the context of supranational institutions, such as the EU and the EEA. 
For a deeper understanding see: Letki, Natalia. Democratic Deficit. Encyclopædia Britannica (2016).   
232 This can be referred to as ‘regulation without representation’  
233 Swiss Confederation. Integration Office FDFA/FDEA. Swiss European Policy – the Bilateral Path. 2009 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deea/dv/2203_07/2203_07en.pdf> (Retrieved 
2016-10-10). 




1972 Free Trade Agreement and the subsequent Insurance Agreement in 1989, the system of 
bilateral agreements has been continuously extended.235 To date the EU and Switzerland have 
signed over 120 bilateral agreements with two major series of sectorial bilateral agreements 
(Bilateral Agreements I and Bilateral Agreements II). The first set of sectorial agreements 
consists of seven agreements, covering the issue of free movement and market opening, 
providing Switzerland with extensive access to the internal market.236 The second set of 
sectorial agreements covers additional economic interest and the extension of the existing 
political cooperation.237 Accordingly, EU legislative areas not covered by bilateral Swiss-EU 
agreements are not applicable in Switzerland.  
 
6.4.2.1. Incorporation of European Union Legislation  
The Swiss model keeps a sense of sovereignty, since changes in EU law will only apply after 
a joint bilateral commission decides so in consensus. New protocols must therefore be 
negotiated from time to time, thus creating a static relationship rather than a flexible 
relationship.238 Even though Switzerland remains opposed to the automatic adoption of EU 
legislation, and wants to retain the right to say ‘no’ to the adoption of EU regulation, the 
Swiss Government stated that:  
 
“In the area of market access, it is as much in Switzerland’s interests as in those of the 
EU to find mechanisms to allow for a rapid adjustment to developments in the EU 
«Acquis», guaranteeing legal homogeneity and legal certainty. Problems with regard to 
the implementation of the agreements and delays in adjusting them to new 
developments in relevant EU law can create new obstacles to access to the EU market, 
legal insecurity, and discrimination against some economic actors involved.”239  
 
The complex relationship between the EU and Switzerland has required it to balance 
closeness to the EU by an approach allowing for a continued adaptation. Recent literature 																																																								
235 Swiss Confederation. Integration Office FDFA/FDEA. Swiss European Policy – the Bilateral Path. 2009 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deea/dv/2203_07/2203_07en.pdf >(Retrieved 
2016-10-10). 
236 Bilateral Agreements I of 1999 is on the free movement of persons, trade in agricultural products, air 
transport, land transport, technical trade barriers, public procurement and research cooperation. Available at: 
Directorate for European Affairs (DEA). Swiss Confederation. The Major Bilateral Agreements Switzerland-EU. 
2016 <https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/dea/en/documents/folien/Folien-Abkommen_en.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-10-
11). 
237 Bilateral Agreements II of 2004 relate to Switzerland’s participation in Schengen and Dublin, agreements on 
taxation savings, processed agricultural products, statistics and combating fraud, participation in the EU’s 
MEDIA programme and the European Environment Agency, and Swiss financial contributions to economic and 
social cohesion in the new EU Member States. Available at: Swiss Directorate For European Affairs. The Major 
Bilateral Agreements Switzerland - EU. 2016 <https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/dea/en/documents/folien/Folien-
Abkommen_en.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-10-11).  
238 European Parliament. The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North. 2016 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.3.html> (Retrieved 2016-10-
10). 




confirms that non-EU Member States, like Switzerland, autonomous adopt legislation 
deriving from the EU, which is commonly referred to as ‘indirect Europeanization’.240 
 
6.4.2.2. Access to the Internal Energy Market  
In accordance with the incorporation process presented above, Switzerland only gains access 
to the internal market in return for adopting legislation equivalent to the EU’s legislation 
governing the internal market. Bilateral agreements concluded between Switzerland and the 
EU regulates most of the conditions of the free movement of persons, goods, services and 
capital; thus providing Switzerland with extensive access to the internal market. Yet, 
Switzerland gains no access to the IEM, since no bilateral agreement concerning the energy 
market has been concluded.   
 
Switzerland is of central importance to the European IEM, given its position and role in 
transmitting electricity, and its reliance on imports of natural gas. However, as a non-member 
Switzerland is not automatically bound by EU energy policy.241 Switzerland has therefore 
engaged in negotiations with the EU on a bilateral agreement in the electricity sector since 
2007 and in 2010, the Federal Council expanded the negotiation mandate to also encompass 
the latest legal developments in the field of energy law.242  
 
In 2014 the Council of the EU adopted a decision authorising the opening of negotiations on 
an institutional agreement between the EU and Switzerland. The institutional agreement shall 
govern EU-Swiss bilateral relations addressing institutional issues distorting the relationship 
between the EU and Switzerland. 243  These negotiations were aimed at settling the problems 
stemming from the evolving nature of the EU acquis related to the internal market and at 
introducing a dispute settlement mechanism governing current bilateral legislation. The 
negotiations on the institutional agreement are considered crucial for the functioning of EU-
Swiss relationship.244 However, the EU has now declared that no further bilateral agreements 
concerning Switzerland’s market integration will be negotiated until the institutional 
agreement is settled (including the negotiation that started in 2010 to enhance the cooperation 
within energy related matters). At the same time, Swiss voters’ rejection in 2014 on the free 
movement of persons threatens further integration (Switzerland wants to restrain the free 
movement of persons). 245  Implementing the results of the vote would not only be 																																																								
240 Pusterla, Elia. The Credibility of Sovereignty – the Political Fiction of a Concept. Springer, 2016, p. 191. 
241 Swiss Federal Office of Energy. International Energy Policy. 2016 
<http://www.bfe.admin.ch/themen/00526/00530/index.html?lang=en> (Retrieved 2016-10-17).  
242 Swiss Federal Office of Energy. Energy Negotiations between Switzerland and the EU. 2012. 
<http://www.bfe.admin.ch/themen/00612/00618/?lang=en> (Retrieved 2016-10-17). 
243 Council of the European Union. Negotiation Mandate for an EU-Switzerland Institutional Framework 
Agreement of 6 May 2014 in Brussels. 9525/14 (OR.en) PRESSE 267.  
244 European Union External Action. Switzerland and the EU. 2016 
<https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/7700/switzerland-and-eu_en> (Retrieved 2016-10-
25).  
245 The Guardian. EU tells Swiss no Single Market Access if no Free Movement of Citizens. 2016-07-03 
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incompatible with the free movement of person provision in the EU, adopted in Bilateral I, 
but would also impose a potential threat to the country’s entire network of bilateral 
agreements with the EU under the ‘guillotine clause’. Accordingly, if one agreement 
governing access to the internal market were to be terminated, other agreements concerning 
access to the internal market would as a result cease to apply.246  
 
There are on-going negotiations between Switzerland and the EU to conclude a bilateral 
agreement concerning energy law. However, following the above mentioned, Switzerland has 
no preferential access to the IEM.  
 
6.4.2.3. Energy Security  
The Swiss Government wants an extensive energy agreement, which allows them to 
participate in the energy security development in Europe. The ambition is to improve 
Switzerland’s access to the IEM by harmonising energy standards.247 Switzerland therefore 
wishes for a more comprehensive energy agreement, with the adoption of the Third Energy 
Package.248 Yet, none of this will be possible if Switzerland unilateral imposes restrictions on 
the free movement of persons, or if it refuses to conclude the institutional agreement 
mentioned above. 
 
6.4.2.4. The Process of Decision-making  
Switzerland takes no part in the drafting of EU legislation. Since every bilateral agreement is 
adopted on a sector-by-sector basis, it is only obliged to adopt developed legislation 
concerning areas already covered by a bilateral agreement.  
 
6.4.3. The Swiss Model Applied to the UK 
Crucial, from the UK’s perspective in securing the supply of gas, is that Switzerland has no 
bilateral agreement with the EU regarding energy related matters. The UK would therefore 
have to regulate the secure supply of gas individually, not participating in the IEM. Even 
though the UK could choose to apply energy law deriving from the EU indirectly, there would 
be no provisions guaranteeing protection within the secure supply of gas currently provided 
for in the IEM and the regulations thereto, since neither the Third Energy Package nor the 
Security of Gas Supply Regulation would be applicable in the UK.  
 
Although the Swiss Model provides an option for the UK to continue its relations with the EU 
and access the internal market, it does not provide for access to the IEM, whereby the energy 
security legislation presented in chapter three is not applicable. This post-withdrawal option 
therefore means that the UK ends up in the same position within energy related matters as if it 																																																								
246 European Parliament. The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North. 2016 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.3.html> (Retrieved 2016-10-
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247 Swiss Federal Office of Energy. International Energy Policy. 2016 
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248 Swiss Federal Office of Energy. Energy Negotiations between Switzerland and the EU. 2012 
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had undertaken a unilateral withdrawal or was to be unsuccessful in negotiating a withdrawal 
agreement within the timeframe provided for in Article 50 TEU. Accordingly, if the UK aims 
to negotiate the Swiss Model it would have to regulate energy security individually, and 
therefore the study in chapter five, on bilateral- and multilateral agreements, would be the 
approach for the UK to secure its supply of gas. 
 
Furthermore, the Swiss model as a post-withdrawal option, with a series of agreements on 
specific issues, would be very difficult for the UK to negotiate with the EU. Unlike the EEA 
Agreement, bilateral agreements are adopted on a case-by-case basis, which means that there 
are no proper mechanisms to adopt evolving EU legislation. With an increasing number of 
sectors being incorporated in bilateral agreements, it has become more difficult to effectively 
manage the significant number of separate agreements. The task to keep all the agreements 
updated becomes both time and resource consuming.249 Not only is it time demanding to keep 
all agreements updated, it will also take a huge amount of time to negotiate bilateral 
agreements covering all the areas mentioned above. Switzerland is still engaging in 
negotiations with the EU to harmonise market actions, even though it completed its first 
agreement over 40 years ago.  
 
6.5. The Turkish Model  
6.5.1.  Introduction  
The relationship between the EU and Turkey falls within category (i) and (ii) of the main 
types of agreements mentioned under bilateral agreements in section 6.2.1. In 1963, Turkey 
signed an Association Agreement with the EU, the ‘Ankara Agreement’,250 and the EU 
envisioned three steps – preparatory, transition and completion – for Turkey’s gradual 
accession to the European common market (internal market). This would be achieved through 
the establishment of a customs union. In 1995 when the transition period eventually was 
completed, the ‘Customs Union Decision’251 was adopted, and Turkey managed to eliminate 
customs duties for EU industrial goods.  
 
Turkey now participates in the EU’s customs union with an association agreement as the 
instrument for inter-regional cooperation. The legal basis for the EU to conclude an 
association agreement is provided in Article 217 of the TFEU.   
 
6.5.2. Customs Union  
The EU comprises a customs union, and it is established in Article 28 TFEU that the customs 
union shall cover all trade in goods and involve the prohibition for one Member State to 
impose custom duties on imports and exports, and charges having equivalent effect, on 																																																								
249 European Parliament. The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North. 2016 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.3.html> (Retrieved 2016-10-
10). 
250 Agreements establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey of 12 
September 1963. OJ L NO 361/29.  
251 Decision No 1/95, of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December on Implementing the Final Phase 
of the Customs Union 96/142/EC [1996] OJ L 035.  
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another Member State. Same provision also confirms the adoption of a CET in EU relations 
with third countries, as well as confirms that the EU negotiates as a single entity in 
international trade deals (see section 3.2.2). Customs unions are accordingly achieved through 
removing trade barriers, and reduce or eliminate customs duty on mutual trade. In contrast to 
a free trade agreement, a customs union imposes a CET on imports from non-member 
countries. Unlike a common market a customs union usually does not allow for the free 
movement of capital and persons among member countries.252 
 
The European Union Customs Union (EUCU) is a customs union between all Member States 
of the EU, some territories of the UK and Monaco.253 Beside the EUCU, the EU has 
concluded individual agreements, paving the opportunity for non-Member States of the EU to 
participate in the European customs union. These separate agreements have been negotiated 
with Andorra, San Marino and Turkey, and include certain exceptions to specific goods.254  
 
The Customs Union Agreement,255 between the EU and Turkey, was the EU’s first substantial 
functioning customs union with a non-Member State. Turkey has adopted the EU’s CET for 
most industrial products and industrial components of agricultural products. The parties have 
engaged in increased trade by eliminating all customs duties, quantitative restrictions and 
charges having equivalent effect in their bilateral trade. Turkey’s accession to the European 
customs union has supported the growth between Turkey and the EU and investment regimes 
have promoted Turkish productivity gains.256 This has furthered Turkey’s alignment with the 
EU acquis. 257 
 
6.5.2.1. Incorporation of European Union Legislation  
The enlargement of the EU is one of its most powerful policy tools and it is a carefully 
managed process, which helps the transformation of the countries involved by promoting 
political, economic and societal reforms. Any state in Europe may apply to become a Member 
State in the EU if it respects the common values of the Member States and remains committed 
to its promotion according to Article 49 of the TEU. The European council incorporated 
																																																								
252 Business Dictionary. Customs Union. <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/customs-union.html> 
(Retrieved 2016-11-21).  
253 European Union External Action. Monaco and the EU. 2016 
<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/customs-union.html> (Retrieved 2016-11-21) 
254 European Commission. Customs Union. 2016 <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-
customs-duties/rules-origin/customs-unions_en> (Retrieved 2016-11-03).   
255 Customs Union Agreement 96/142/EC. 
256 Delegation of the European Union to Turkey. Customs Union. 2016 <http://avrupa.info.tr/eu-trade-and-
economy/customs-union.html> (Retrieved 2016-11-12).  
257 The acquis is the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU Member States. It is 
constantly evolving and comprises chapters all relevant as conditions for membership (e.g. free movement 
provisions, energy, environment, customs union, external relations) available at: European Commission. 
European Commission, Enlargement and Acquis. 2016 <http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en> (Retrieved 2016-12-15).  
	 68	
conditions for a ‘gradual, harmonious integration’ of accession by requiring the country of 
concern to align its legislation to that of the EU and to ensure its implementation.258  
 
The association agreement concluded between the EU and Turkey was the first step towards 
Turkey’s full membership in the Union and the agreement with Turkey addresses regulatory 
areas of so-called ‘deep integration’ contributing to Turkey’s adaption to EU legislation. The 
EU enlargement process took a major step forward in 2005 when accession negotiations were 
opened with, among others, Turkey. After years of preparation Turkey formally opened the 
next stage of the accession process. With the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement in force, 
Turkey already eliminates customs duties on imports and exports, and charges having 
equivalent effect towards EU Member States, and participates in the adoption of the CET. 
However, with the accession process there is a need to adapt a considerable part of its 
national legislation in line with EU law. In order to become a Member State in the EU, 
Turkey must bring its institutions, management capacity and administrative and judicial 
systems up to EU standards, both at a national and regional level; the result being an effective 
implementation of EU laws before the potential accession. Accordingly, Turkey does not 
negotiate on the acquis communautaire itself with the EU, as the rules must be fully adopted 
by them upon accession.259 In this sense Turkey already engage, indirectly, in a large portion 
of internal EU legislation, beside the EU legislation it already adopts due to its participation in 
the customs union.  
 
6.5.2.2. Access to the Internal Energy Market  
Regarding Turkey’s internal market access it can be concluded that Turkey, in addition to 
eliminating internal tariffs and agree on the CETs, already foresees to align to the acquis 
communautaire in several essential internal market areas.260 The EU customs union is directly 
authorised to control international trade. However it is also devoted to the external aspect of 
the internal market, namely the promotion of an open market aiming at fair trade without 
discrimination; the function of the internal market can therefore be considered somewhat 
dependent on the function of the customs union, since goods entering through the common 
EU border are allowed equal treatment to domestic goods. Considering all these factors, 
Turkey as a non-EU Member State, still needs to adopt a vast majority of EU legislation 
closely connected to the functioning of the internal market.  
 
With the potential accession of Turkey’s membership in the EU, Turkey is already being 
encouraged to adopt regulatory standards relating to EU energy legislation, but also this 
there is; the European Commission released the Energy Union Communication in 2015, 
																																																								
258 European Parliament. The Enlargement of the European Union. 2016 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.1.html> (Retrieved 2016-11-
12).  
259 Delegation of the European Union to Turkey. Customs Union. 2016 <http://avrupa.info.tr/eu-trade-and-
economy/customs-union.html> (Retrieved 2016-11-12). 
260 European Commission. Countries and Regions: Turkey. 2016 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/turkey/> (Retrieved 2016-11-21). 
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calling for intensified work on the establishment of a new strategic energy partnership with 
Turkey.261  
 
6.5.2.3. Energy Security  
The establishment of a new strategic energy partnership with Turkey brings the EU and 
Turkey closer in energy related matters. The energy dialogue expressed the parties’ 
willingness to cooperate further in securing and diversifying energy supplies.262   
 
In the ‘Turkey-EU High Level Energy Dialogue’ in Istanbul 2016, both sides underlined the 
importance of Turkey as a key country for Europe’s energy security (Turkey is currently a 
regional energy hub and transition country for the EU). Because of the Southern Gas Corridor 
project (see section 3.2.4), Turkey plays a major role in the EU’s energy security strategy. 
Turkey is ready to fulfil its responsibilities in terms of contributing to EU’s security of gas 
supplies through various pipeline and interconnection projects. Furthermore, Turkey is 
already participating physically in the electricity market after the agreement signed in January 
2016 between the Turkish national transmission system operator and the European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity. This means that Turkey is connected to the 
transmission network in Europe and electricity can flow freely both ways.263 The on-going 
project with the Southern Gas Corridor indicates that it will not take long before the gas 
market is physically integrated between Turkey and the EU as well, which will result in 
Turkey’s physical access to the European gas market.   
 
Notable is that the High Energy Dialogue stresses the importance of both the EU’s and 
Turkey’s energy security. This statement presumes that Turkey is already partially included 
in the European energy security strategy. The EU and Turkey accentuate the mutual interest 
in a competitive market preserving energy supplies to an affordable price for both parties.264  
 
6.5.2.4. The Process of Decision-making  
In line with earlier presented models, Turkey has no influence over the rules of the customs 
union, or the rules it has to implement to comply with in accordance with the agreement 
establishing the EU-Turkey customs union.  
 
6.5.3. The Turkish Model applied to the UK 
The Turkish Model, as a customs union, provides for no preferential access to the IEM. 
However, the establishment of a new strategic energy partnership between the EU and Turkey 																																																								
261 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank the 25 of February 2015. 
Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM (2015) 
80 Final.  
262 European Commission. EU-Turkey High Level Energy Dialogue and Strategic Energy Cooperation. 2015 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/arias-canete/announcements/eu-turkey-high-level-energy-dialogue-
and-strategic-energy-cooperation_en> (Retrieved 2016-09-20).  
263 Ibid.   
264 Ibid.  
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brings the latter closer to access the IEM, since Turkey is now interconnected in the electricity 
grid and soon to be in the pipeline interconnection. Turkey therefore needs to adopt 
legislation in line with EU legislation governing these interconnections (see section 3.3.2.4 
regarding cross-border cooperation in the EU). In these matters Turkey and the UK is 
somewhat similar to each other. The UK is also physically connected to the gas market 
through its pipelines, and would under this model be required to adapt to EU energy 
legislation to regulate the interconnection. However, this option would only provide the UK 
partial access to the IEM, and no further rights or obligations under the energy security 
regulations than that of regulating the physical interconnections.  
 
Additionally, a major difference between the UK and Turkey is present, as Turkey has been a 
candidate to join the EU since 1995. Accordingly, a customs union agreement is usually an 
option for pre-accession for a country to become a future EU Member State. It is important to 
mention that the EU, through the EU enlargement programme, extends certain benefits to 
Turkey (such as deepened cooperation in energy security matters) because of its upcoming 
accession as a Member State. It is therefore questionable, whether the EU would be as 
generous with a country like the UK de facto withdrawing its membership in the EU.  
 
Turkey is also a candidate state for the European Energy Community,265 however this option 
will be examined later on under the Albanian Model (see section 6.7).   
 
6.6. The Canadian Model  
6.6.1. Introduction  
The relationship between the EU and Canada falls within category (ii) and (iii) of the main 
types of agreements mentioned under bilateral agreements in section 6.2.1.The EU and its 
Member States, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part signed two agreements in 
October 2016, namely the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)266 and 
the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA).267  
 
6.6.2. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement  
CETA is the most comprehensive and progressive trade agreement the EU has ever 
committed to, removing over 99 per cent of tariffs that currently hinders trade between the 
parties.268 Article 1.4 of the CETA defines the collaboration as a free trade agreement and 
provides for market access and liberalisation beyond the GATT.269,270 The scope of the CETA 																																																								
265 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee of November 2011 on Implementation of the Communication on Security of Energy Supply and 
International Cooperation and of the Energy Council COM/2013/638 Final.  
266 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement of 14 September 2016 between Canada, of the one part, and 
the European Union and its Member States, of the other part. COM (2016) 470 Final.  
267 Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) of 5 August 2016 between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part. JOIN/2015/0010 final – NLE/2015/0073.  
268 Council of the European Union. EU-Canada Summit, Brussels, 30/10/2016. 2016 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2016/10/30/> (Retrieved 2016-11-01).  
269 European Commission. Bilateral Investment Dialogues and Trade Agreements. 2016 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital/third-countries/bilateral_relations/index_en.htm> (Retrieved 2016-11-01).  
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is broad and covers a range of areas, which will not be covered in this thesis due to little 
relevance for the evaluation of energy security matters.271 
 
6.6.2.1. Strategic Partnership Agreement  
The EU-Canada SPA was adopted to deepen and broaden the scope of the bilateral 
cooperation on a range of issues. Once ratified, it will form the base upon, which the EU-
Canada political relations will be based. Together with the CETA, the SPA will take EU and 
Canada relations to a new level of intensified and structured engagement.272  
 
6.6.2.2. Access to the IEM and Energy Security  
Canada has access to the internal market through the CETA. This access is however 
restricted to certain areas such as goods and services. Because of the geographical location of 
Canada there is little to mention regarding energy related matters. Article 12 of the SPA 
however stresses energy related concerns, and paragraph 6 provides for the following:  
 
“The Parties recognise the importance of the energy sector to economic prosperity and 
international peace and stability. They agree on the need to improve and diversify 
energy supplies, promote innovation and increase energy efficiency in order to 
strengthen energy opportunity, energy security, and sustainable and affordable energy. 
The Parties shall maintain a high-level dialogue on energy and continue to collaborate 
through bilateral and multilateral means in order to support open and competitive 
markets, share best practices, promote science-based, transparent regulation, and 
discuss areas of cooperation on energy issues.” 
 
The CETA and the SPA provide for a comprehensive cooperation in trade and also addresses 
the importance of energy security. However, Canada retains no access to the IEM and is 
under no protection of EU legislation governing the secure supply of gas.  
 
6.6.3. The Canadian Model Applied to the UK 
The Canadian Model is similar to the Swiss Model in many respects and Canada was chosen 
specifically to give an example of a free trade agreement and a partnership agreement 
concluded between the EU and a third country. The Swiss Model consists of a broad network 
of accession agreements and sectorial bilateral agreements, providing Switzerland with 
certain access to the internal market, demanding the country to apply a vast majority of EU 
legislation. The Canadian Model however, unlike the Swiss Model, provides that an extensive 																																																																																																																																																																													
270 Both the EU and Canada are members of the WTO and therefore obliged to apply provisions under the GATT 
(see chapter five) and Article 1.4 of the CETA expresses that the free trade agreement has been established in 
conformity with Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. 
271 Areas covered by the CETA is available in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Decision of the Council 
Decision of 5 July 2016 on the provisional application of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between Canada of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, COM (2016) 
470 Final. 2016/0220(NLE).   
272 Government of Canada. Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). 2016 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/spa-
aps.aspx?lang=eng> (Retrieved 2016-11-02).  
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amount of EU legislation would cease to apply if this model were to be negotiated. Another 
major difference is also that Switzerland, unlike Canada, is participating in the EFTA. 
 
The Canadian Model entails the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the EU post-
withdrawal, in order to gain access to the internal market (for goods, and to some extent for 
services). The market access is however not as broad as for Switzerland or the Member States 
participating in the EU/EEA.273 Another considerable aspect is also that the UK, under the 
Canadian Model, would have little, if any influence over internal market legislation. 
 
The Canadian Model provides the option to negotiate specific energy matters with the EU. 
Unlike Canada, the UK is already physically connected into the European gas market, and 
highly dependent on gas imports from continental Europe. As with the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement, enhancing a deeper cooperation, the UK could endeavour to conclude specific 
provisions addressing the secure supply of gas. The risk is however, that this would only 
guarantee the UK energy dialogues and no specific obligations – substantive actions – for the 
EU to follow the aims set out between the parties.  
 
As with the Swiss Model, this model would be very time demanding for all parties involved, 
and would probably take longer to negotiate than the two years provided for in Article 50 of 
the TEU. In the end, it all comes down to in what areas the UK has an interest to conclude a 
deal with the EU, and whether the EU has a mutual interest for an agreement in this specific 
area. A free trade deal is however of no interest when addressing energy security matters, 
other than the fact that the EU and the UK could negotiate preferential conditions governing 
trade in gas between the parties.274 
 
As with the Swiss Model, the UK would under the Canadian Model, end up in the same 
position within energy related matters as if it had undertaken a unilateral withdrawal or was to 
be unsuccessful in negotiating a withdrawal agreement within the timeframe provided for in 
Article 50 of the TEU. Accordingly, if the UK aims to negotiate the Canadian Model the UK 
would have to regulate energy security individually, and therefore the analysis undertaken in 
chapter five, the bilateral- and multilateral agreements, would be the approach for the UK to 
secure its supply of gas under this option. 
 
 																																																								
273 This option is dependent on whether the UK takes part in the WTO or not, since there are some restrictions to 
free trade agreements. Member States of the WTO that enters into a regional integration arrangement through 
which they grant each other more favourable terms and conditions than that of other Member States departs from 
the fundamental objective of non-discrimination expressed in Article 1 of the GATT (see section 5.2.2.1.1). 
WTO members are however allowed to conclude such agreements under specific conditions (Article XXIV of 
GATT formation and operation of customs unions and free trade areas covering goods, Article V of GATT in the 
area of trade in services and the Enabling Clause referring to preferential trade arrangements in trade in goods 
between developing countries). Available at: World Trade Organisation. The WTO’s Rules. 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regrul_e.htm> (Retrieved 2016-09-18). 
274 The EU and the UK can negotiate better conditions than those provided in the GATT (see footnote 273).  
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6.7. The Albanian Model  
6.7.1. Introduction  
The relationship between the EU and Albania is diversified. Firstly, Albania participates as a 
CS in the Energy Community mentioned in section 6.2.2. Its participation in the Energy 
Community is the reason for including Albania in this study.275 Secondly, it is however 
mentionable that the EU and Albania have concluded a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA),276 which falls within category (ii) of the main types of agreements under 
bilateral agreements mentioned in section 6.2.1. As with Turkey, Albania has applied for 
accession to EU membership. The association agreement is concluded to strengthen the 
parties’ cooperation and establish a closer relationship based on reciprocity and mutual 
interest, which would allow Albania to further extend its relations with the EU. The 
association agreement also addresses energy matters; Article 107 of the SAA provides: 
 
“Energy Cooperation shall focus on priority areas related to the Community acquis in 
the field of energy […] it shall be based on the signed regional Energy Community 
Treaty with a view to the gradual integration of Albania into Europe’s energy markets” 
 
6.7.2. Energy Community  
The Energy Community is an international organisation containing the EU, represented by the 
European Commission, and the countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine; these 
countries are known as the CS (mentioned in section 3.2.2).277 The Treaty establishing the 
Energy Community was singed in October 2005 and entered in to force in July 2006. The 
Energy Community Treaty was valid until July 2016, but was extended until 2026 by the 
unanimous agreement of the Ministerial Council, which is the highest decision-making body 
of the Energy Community.278   
 
The objective of the Energy Community is to expand the EU’s IEM to neighbouring countries 
presented in the Preamble of the Energy Community Treaty.279 The Energy Community 
Treaty requires all CS to adopt EU energy legislation, creating an expanded internal market 
for energy encompassing EU and CS. In doing so the Energy Community has developed its 
own body of law, known as the Energy Community acquis, which all CS must transpose into 
its national legislation and subsequently enforce according to Article 9-21 of the Energy 
Community Treaty.  																																																								
275 The Albanian Model is applied to state an example of being a Contracting State in the Energy Community. 
As this thesis focuses on energy security, it is therefore only of interest to understand what the relationship as a 
CS with the Energy Community will mean for the UK post-withdrawal.  
276 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part of 12 June 2006. COM/2006/0138 Final.  
277 European Commission. Energy Community. 2016 <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/international-
cooperation/energy-community> (Retrieved 2016-11-07). 
278 European Parliament. Energy Community: Prospects and Challenges. 2015 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569011/EPRS_BRI(2015)569011_EN.pdf> 
(Retrieved 2016-09-18).   
279 Energy Community Treaty 2006/500/EC.  
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6.7.2.1. Access to the IEM and Energy Security  
All CS are obliged to comply with the EU energy acquis. It has been presented by Stephen 
Padgett, an academic expert in the field, that the Energy Community is not only active in 
transposing the ‘pre-signature acquis’ (i.e. the body of energy law in force at the time of the 
signature) but also the ‘dynamic acquis’ (i.e. the body of energy law recently incorporated in 
the field of energy in the EU). Expanding the scope of the Energy Community acquis requires 
a positive decision by the Ministerial Council, which endorsed the transposition of the Third 
Energy Package. This flexible mechanism has also allowed the Energy Community to 
incorporate new energy legislation – e.g. the Security of Gas Supply Regulation – and 
continues to allow incorporation of changes in EU energy law.280 
 
6.7.3. The Albanian Model Applied to the UK 
The option to become a CS in the Energy Community, as the Albanian Model implies, would 
require the UK to adopt the EU’s energy acquis communautaire through the ratification of the 
Energy Community Treaty. If the UK were to become a CS in the Energy Community post-
withdrawal, the UK would retain access to the IEM and adopt regulations thereto. This 
option, would give the same result as the Norwegian Model, as the UK would have to adopt 
both the Gas Directive and the Security of Gas Supply Regulation, which is recognised as the 
two fundamental regulations in the EU in order to safeguard the secure supply of gas in the 
EU (see chapter three).  
 
6.8. The Outcome of the Soft and the Grey Brexit  
The goal for the UK, presented in section 2.4, is to adopt legislative measures safeguarding 
the supply of gas post-Brexit. Given this fact, it needs to be taken into consideration, that the 
current energy legislation applicable in the UK addresses energy security issues and provide 
mechanisms to attain a constant flow of gas to the UK. As presented in chapter three, the 
current legislative framework is not yet flawless, but at least provides a certain level of 
security to safeguard the supply of gas for its Member States.  
 
If the UK were to negotiate participation as a Member State in the EEA/EFTA or as a CS in 
the Energy Community, the UK would retain its preferential access to the IEM. By 
negotiating either the Norwegian Model or the Albanian Model with the EU, the UK would 
adopt the same energy legislation as status quo (see section 6.3.3 and 6.7.3). 
 
If the UK were to negotiate a customs union with the EU, the UK would participate in the 
EU’s external trade policy and to some extent harmonise regulations governing the internal 
market. By negotiating the Turkish Model, the UK would partially retain its preferential 
access to the IEM. This is due to the fact that Turkey gains partial access to the IEM because 
of its interconnection with the European electricity grid, and future interconnection with the 																																																								
280 European Parliament. Energy Community: Prospects and Challenges. 2015 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569011/EPRS_BRI(2015)569011_EN.pdf> 
(Retrieved 2016-09-18).   
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European gas market. With the UK already physically interconnected to the European gas 
market through pipelines, its future relations with the EU could look somewhat similar to that 
of Turkey. The UK would, under this existing option, indirectly have to adopt energy 
legislation similar to status quo, as the physical interconnection with the European gas market 
and interaction between actors in the gas market needs to be harmonised (see section 6.5.3). 
 
However, if the UK were to negotiate sectorial bilateral agreements or a free trade agreement 
with the EU, the UK would not retain its preferential access to the IEM. By negotiating either 
the Swiss Model or the Canadian Model, the UK would not apply the same energy legislation 
as status quo (see section 6.4.3 and 6.6.3). Accordingly, negotiating one of these existing 
options would provide for the same analysis undertaken in chapter five (see section 5.2.3), 
where no EU-relation within energy matters is settled.  
 
The ‘soft’ and the ‘grey’ Brexit accordingly refer to a continued relationship with the EU by 
negotiating a withdrawal agreement, however only some of the existing models allow for the 
UK to retain its current preferential access to the IEM and adopt the EU’s regulations 
governing energy security. Accordingly, the only way to collaborate with the EU upon gas 
security, given these options, is for the UK to participate in the IEM. As the ‘soft’ Brexit 
allows the UK to retain access to the IEM, both the ‘grey’ and the ‘hard’ Brexit imply that the 
UK break relations with the EU upon gas security.   
 
The ‘soft’ Brexit (the Norwegian and the Albanian and the Turkish models) where the UK 
retains somewhat preferential access to the IEM guarantees a legislative framework 
safeguarding the supply of gas. Although the ‘grey’ option (the Swiss Model and the 
Canadian Model) refers to a continued relationship with the EU, this option does not include a 
relationship with the EU upon energy security and therefore provides for the same outcome 
within energy matters as the ‘hard’ Brexit. Therefore, the country based models concerned as 
the ‘grey’ Brexit, secure gas supply through the same legislative measures as the ‘hard’ Brexit 
by negotiating and committing to bilateral- and multilateral trade and energy agreements with 





7. Discussion of Results – Energy Security  
7.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapters I have studied options of the ‘hard’, the ‘grey’ and the ‘soft’ Brexit 
safeguarding the supply of gas and a variety of legislative measures safeguarding the supply 
of gas have been identified. The self-sufficiency option however, has been evaluated as an 
insecure option to the UK in section 5.3-5.4. Whether the other options available for the UK 
post-Brexit can be considered to safeguard the supply of gas in the UK will be discussed next.  
 
Previously in this research I have made the distinction between the ‘hard’ Brexit on the one 
hand, and the ‘grey’ and the ‘soft’ Brexit on the other hand. However, after the analysis in 
chapter five and six I have concluded in section 6.8 that this distinction is no longer valid for 
energy related matters. As the examination of the existing options for the UK post-Brexit in 
these chapters shows that the main distinction between the existing options available, 
specifically for the energy sector, is whether the UK retain the current preferential access to 
the IEM and adopts the regulations thereto.  
 
If a withdrawal agreement is negotiated with the EU not allowing the UK access to the IEM, a 
‘grey’ Brexit, or if a unilateral withdrawal were undertaken by the UK, a ‘hard’ Brexit, the 
UK would be excluded from the current regional cooperation within energy related matters in 
the EU. In contrast the ‘soft’ Brexit provides for a continued cooperation with the EU in 
energy related matters. The following can be concluded regarding access to the IEM from the 
existing options presented in chapter five and six.  
 
Existing options  Type of Brexit regarding 
the energy sector  
Access to the IEM  
The Norwegian Model  Soft Yes 
The Swiss Model Grey No 
The Turkish Model Soft Partially* 
The Canadian Model  Grey No 
The Albanian Model  Soft Yes  
Bilateral agreements Hard No 
Multilateral agreements Hard No 
Self-sufficiency Hard No 
 
*Access with restrictions. Turkey is currently being integrated into the IEM by adopting European energy acquis 
for further membership accession in the EU. Turkey has also been integrated to the electricity grid and is 
awaiting interconnection into the pipeline market. 
 
7.2. The Regional or the National Gas Market? 
The ‘grey’ and the ‘hard’ Brexit will result in the UK regulating energy security on a national 
level, adopting its actions to the international gas market, whilst the ‘soft’ Brexit will result in 
the UK participating in the IEM where energy security is regulated on a regional level. This 
	 77	
section therefore discusses potential benefits and disadvantages with regulating energy 
security on a regional or a national level.281  
 
Bartlomiej Nowak indicates in his research paper that energy specialists are divided, some 
arguing that the liberalisation of the energy market, together with the entire range of legal 
instruments, may contribute to undermining energy security for countries participating in the 
liberalisation of the energy market. Following this argument energy experts argue that 
countries, as a result of the liberalisation, lose control over the gas market decreasing energy 
security.282 Others argue that the liberalisation of the energy market is followed by an 
increased level of competition, in sectors earlier dominated by natural monopolies, which will 
contribute to enhance energy security, as there will be an increased number of gas sellers in 
the market.283 Following this line, it is argued that the third party access regime, regulation of 
natural monopolies, unbundling and the abolition of price caps284 in the European energy 
market have increased the number of gas sellers in the market. Additionally, a market with 
many competitors renders the gas market’s functioning more flexible, which further leads to 
the promotion of competition, resulting in benefits for consumers due to a variety of choices 
and higher quality of services.285 According to theory, the larger the market is and the fewer 
barriers to trade within gas, the higher the level of competition and the lower the prices for 
end consumers will be. Kim Talus indicates in his research that it is of significant importance 
to remember that the pre-liberalisation era consisted of government-cantered systems with 
monopolies guaranteeing the secure supply of natural gas. Although this was usually done 
successfully in many countries, it usually resulted in over-investment with cost passed on to 
the end-user.286 This national approach of organisation was therefore deemed economically 
inefficient. The idea in the EU was therefore that a geographically larger market would 
provide a safety net for national problems (see section 3.2.3 and 3.3.3.3).287  
 
To summarize, there are both arguments in favour of safeguarding energy on a regional (‘soft’ 
Brexit), as well as on a national level (‘grey’/ ‘hard’ Brexit), and energy specialists are 
therefore divided on the subject. Whether these options fit the UK is greatly dependent upon 																																																								
281 See section 3.3.3.4 and 5.4. 
282 Stern, Jonathan. Competition and Liberalisation in European Gas Markets: A Diversity of Models. London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 91 in: Nowak, Bartlomiej. Polish Gas Market in Transition – 
Challenges Of Liberalization in the Context of Energy Security. OGEL, Vol. 13, no. 2 (2015): p. 4. 
283 Egenhofer, Christian and Egge, Thomas. Security of Energy Supply: A Question for Policy or the Markets? 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Vol. 41 (2001): p. 1 in: Nowak, Bartlomiej. Polish Gas Market in Transition 
– Challenges Of Liberalization in the Context of Energy Security. OGEL, Vol. 13, no. 2 (2015): p. 4. 
284 A price cap regulation is a form of economic regulation generally specific to the utility industry in the UK. 
Price cap regulation sets a cap on the price that the utility providers can charge. Available at: Investopedia. Price 
Cap Regulation. 2016 <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/revenue-cap-regulation.asp> (Retrieved 2016-11-
13).  
285 Nowak, Bartlomiej. Polish Gas Market in Transition – Challenges Of Liberalization in the Context of Energy 
Security. OGEL, Vol. 13, no. 2 (2015): p. 5.  
286 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 98-99.  
287 Von Hirschhausen, Christian, Beckers, Thorsten and Brenck, Andreas. Regulation and Long-Term 
Investment in Infrastructure Provision – Theory and Policy. Utilities Policy. Vol. 12, no. 4 (2004): p. 206-207 in: 
Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 98-99. 
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the UK’s individual gas conditions. In the next section I will discuss which of the legal 
frameworks providing measures for gas security that may safeguard the UK’s gas supplies.288 
 
7.3. UK Specific Comparison of Existing Options  
Chapter two identified three vital aspects of energy security. It was presented that if a 
country’s size of domestic gas production does not cover the demand, the country is 
considered to be dependent on imports of gas. To provide sufficient gas, trans boundary trade 
needs to be enhanced to guarantee the availability of gas, secured through gas supply 
agreements or purchase of gas in the spot-market. This will allow the country of concern to 
diversify its gas routes. Furthermore, an import dependent country needs to guarantee the 
accessibility of gas by investing in the necessary infrastructure and transportation needs, as 
well as the adequate import- and storage capacity. Another aspect is the affordability, as a 
country needs to make sure that gas is not too expensive as this might restrain the possibility 
to safeguard the supply of gas. Although this is to prevent a gas crisis, the country of concern 
also needs to be able to cope in case of one whereby legislation should address necessary 
actions needed. Next, I will discuss to what extent the ‘grey’/’hard’ and the ‘soft’ Brexit meet 
these criteria.  
 
7.3.1. Availability  
The ‘grey’/’hard’ Brexit would allow the UK to decide, without the involvement of the EU, to 
keep gas as the key energy source in its energy mix, as well as how to diversify its sources of 
energy as the EU through the Renewable Energy Directive sets a binding target of 20 per cent 
final energy consumption from renewable sources by 2020.289 The UK could for example 
focus on gas trade in the LNG market, as this is not bound to the EU, in contrast to natural gas 
exports from continental Europe. However, whether the UK will be an attractive destination 
for spare LNG volumes or not, is more likely to be driven by the price of gas in the UK 
market, more than any other factor. The UK could also focus its gas trade in the pipeline 
market, importing gas from Norway rather than continental Europe, since the entire 
infrastructure is already in place for such transportation of gas. Gas trade in the LNG market 
and the pipeline market would be governed by bilateral supply agreements and protected 
against discriminatory behaviour by the application of the GATT and the ECT, under the MFN 
clause (Article I:1 of the GATT and Article 29(2)(a) of the ECT), the national treatment 
principle (Article III:1 of the GATT of the Article 29(2)(a)) and the prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions (Article XI of the GATT).  
 
However, the UK’s gas trade would look fairly the same if it were to continue its participation 
with the EU in energy related matters (‘soft’ Brexit). Trade in the LNG market and the 
pipeline market with third countries (other than the EU’s Member States) would also be 
governed by bilateral agreements and protected under the provisions mentioned in the GATT 																																																								
288 See chapter two regarding a country’s gas particularities (e.g. adequate infrastructure, storage and import 
capacity, domestic gas production).  
289 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the 
Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directive 2001/77/EC and 
2003/20/EC.  
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and the ECT. However, the main difference would be that gas trade with continental Europe 
would not be subjected to external tariffs, as the UK would participate in the IEM, where the 
EU has removed numerous of obstacles and trade barriers due to its measures creating an 
integrated and liberalised energy market (legal basis in Article 194 of the TFEU). This is a 
vital concern for the UK, as it currently imports a large share of gas yearly from continental 
Europe. Furthermore, such participation in the integrated and the liberalised European gas 
market is believed to create a stronger bargaining position for European gas companies. The 
IEM is said to act as a guarantor of energy security for its participating states because of its 
adoption of the Third Energy Package and the Security of Gas Supply Regulation, providing a 
better negotiation position in the international gas market.290 
 
7.3.2. Accessibility 
The UK already has mitigation against security of supply risks built into the gas infrastructure 
system, as the existing import infrastructure allows multiple sources of supply via its gas 
pipeline interconnection and LNG import facilities. It is therefore likely that the 
infrastructure, the connection the UK has with Norway, continental Europe and the LNG 
market, will continue to be used.291 In case of a ‘grey’ or a ‘hard’ Brexit, transport of gas 
through these facilities will be protected against discriminatory behaviour in the transmission 
of gas, while also allowing for an unrestricted transit of gas during imports in accordance 
with the provisions adopted in Article V of the GATT and in Article 7.5 of the ECT. However, 
if the UK were to continue its participation with the EU in energy related matters (a ‘soft’ 
Brexit), the UK would also gain protection concerning cross-border interconnection in the 
regional market (see section 3.3.2.4).  
 
7.3.3. During Crisis  
The UK possesses adequate import facilities and has the possibility to respond with increased 
imports of gas in case of a peak-demand in the foreseeable future. The UK has a total import 
infrastructure capacity of some 150 billon cubic metre (bcm), whilst the country’s annual gas 
consumption lies between 80 and 100 bcm.292 Furthermore, additional integration of the UK 
to gas markets is probably not necessary, although an increased demand in natural gas might 
require a higher storage capacity in the UK. However, the UK already possesses excess 
storage capacity, and Vivid Economics presented that there would have to be a simultaneous 
loss of 60-70 per cent of gas sources to cause supply interruption to domestic consumers.293 In 
case such a disruption occurs, the ‘grey’ and the ‘hard’ Brexit imply that the UK will be 
excluded from the EU’s energy security regime. With the EU’s principle of solidarity, the 
Member States of the EU and the CS of the Energy Community are obliged to assist each 																																																								
290 Nowak, Bartlomiej. Polish Gas Market in Transition – Challenges of Liberalization in the Context of Energy 
Security. OGEL, Vol. 13, no. 2 (2015): p. 2. 
291 See chapter 2, section 5.2.1, section 5.2.3 and section 5.4.  
292 Kopp, Sandu-Daniel. Politics, Markets and EU Gas Supply Security: Case Studies of the UK and Germany. 
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015, p. 124-126.  
293 Vivid Economics. The Impact of Brexit on the UK Energy Sector: An Assessment of the Risks and 
Opportunities for Electricity and Gas in the UK. 2016 <http://www.vivideconomics.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/VE-note-on-impact-of-Brexit-on-the-UK-energy-system.pdf> (Retrieved 2016-09-16).  
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other during a supply shock.294 Accordingly, the UK could face security of supply risks in the 
longer term, due to the exclusion from the European energy security regime. The EU is not 
obliged to assist third countries during supply shocks and this could affect the UK negatively 
during a shortage in gas supplies or when additional gas is needed for peak demands (e.g. cold 
weather). To enhance the secure supply of natural gas the UK Government would therefore 
have to aim to diversify gas routes and lower the dependence on gas coming from continental 
Europe by incentivising gas trade through bilateral supply agreements, discussed in section 
5.2.1 (e.g. with Norway or Qatar).   
 
Additionally, in line with chapter three, another important aspect is the preparation of risk 
assessments, preventive action plans and emergency plans, which require all Member States 
to identify energy security risks together in accordance with Article 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the 
Security of Gas Supply Regulation. By participating in the IEM the UK would therefore not 
bare the burden of energy security itself, but rather cooperate to access gas reserves and 
safeguard the supply of gas together with the EU. The general consensus in the UK is that the 
country’s growing import dependence represents a serious challenge. However, despite the 
risk of exclusion it is presented by Sandu-Daniel Kopp that the UK nonetheless has means to 
meet emergency supply situations. Imports have not been an outspoken supply challenge for 
the UK, because of the construction of extensive gas import infrastructure as well as the 
flourished LNG gas trade.295 Gas supply emergency events since the year of 2000 have 
proven the UK to be able to react to extreme gas supply and demand challenges.296 However, 
this might change in the future due to higher competition from gas-hungry economies (e.g. 
Asia), and the change of perspective from major gas producing countries (e.g. Russia) 
towards the east. 
 
7.3.4. Affordability 
Additionally, to what has been mentioned above, gas supply emergency events since 2000 
have proven the UK to be able to react to extreme supply and demand challenges. Although 
the UK has succeeded in ensuring the accessibility of gas, the affordability of gas remains a 
concern. Regardless of its participation in the IEM prices have become too volatile.297  The 
UK’s current framework does not allow absorbing any sudden incidents; for example, the fire 
at Rough storage facility in 2006 pushed the consumer price for gas up for many months.298 																																																								
294 The Solidarity Principle, established by the EU, ensures solidarity among Member States in case of an 
emergency (e.g. supply shocks). EU countries are obliged to help out a neighbouring EU country if they are 
experiencing gas supply trouble. In the event of a gas crisis in a Member State, neighbouring countries will 
ensure the gas supply to households, essential services such as healthcare and district heating. Available at: 
European Commission. New Rules to Boost Gas Supply Security and Solidarity. 2016 
<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/new-rules-boost-gas-supply-security-and-solidarity> (Retrieved 2016-09-
20).  
295 Kopp, Sandu-Daniel. Politics, Markets and EU Gas Supply Security: Case Studies of the UK and Germany. 
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015, p. 169.   
296 Ibid.    
297 Heffron, Raphael J. Energy Law: An Introduction. Springer, 2014, p. 44-45. 
298 Kopp, Sandu-Daniel. Politics, Markets and EU Gas Supply Security: Case Studies of the UK and Germany. 
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015, p. 169.   
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However, the price of gas is a matter for the market and will not be greatly affected by 
whether the UK participates in the IEM or not.  
 
Another factor important to mention regarding cost implications is that if the UK undertakes a 
unilateral withdrawal it would be subjected to drastic changes in the energy sector due to the 
termination of the current energy legislation. If the UK however succeeds to negotiate a 
continued participation in the IEM and therefore continues to adopt regulations thereto, it 
would not be subjected to any legislative changes in the energy sector. As cost implications 
are often driven by drastic changes, this latter option would probably be less keen to increase 
the price of gas as a commodity being imported by the UK.   
 
Not accessing the IEM and adopting the regulations thereto might pose a considerable risk for 
the UK to safeguard its supply of gas since it is acting outside the compliance of the EU’s 
energy security regime, which has proven to provide its members with a secure supply of gas. 
In line with the discussion above however there are aspects that suggest that the UK is not 
dependent on the EU’s regulation concerning energy security, for it to safeguard the supply of 
gas. The UK has better individual gas ratio than most other Member States of the EU. 
Accordingly, the ‘grey’ and the ’hard’ Brexit might not affect the UK’s ability to safeguard 
gas supply to the same extent than other participants in the IEM. This assumption is based on 
the facts that the UK produces domestic gas, possesses adequate infrastructure for import and 
storage of gas, and is well integrated to the pipeline- and LNG markets. These are 




8. Discussion of Results – the Political Perspective of the Brexit 
8.1. Introduction  
As this thesis is written from a state perspective, intended to be of guiding principle to inform 
the decision process of the UK, this research provides existing options available to the UK, 
safeguarding its supply of gas post-Brexit. However, to be able to recommend a certain 
existing option to the UK the different existing options safeguarding the supply of gas needs 
to be placed within the political perspective of the Brexit, as to evaluate whether these options 
meet the requirements of the pro-Brexit camp.  
 
8.2. Reasons for the UK to Leave the EU  
Reasons for the UK voting out of the EU was introduced in section 1.1. One of the main 
reasons for the UK’s residents to vote out of the EU seems to be the free movement of 
persons.299 When entering negotiations with the EU, there is a probability that the UK will 
aim to restrict this freedom. However, the UK might contrarily aim to preserve the benefits 
gained from the free market access in other areas, such as the free movement of goods, 
protecting the profit it brings to its economy.300 To address this complex situation, the EU is 
already consulting with Switzerland in these matters, since Switzerland decided to restrict the 
free movement of persons referred to in section 6.4.2.2. Switzerland has negotiated a 
‘safeguard clause’ allowing them to introduce limits on the free movement of persons, if 
immigration becomes too high.301 After a decision to invoke this clause, the EU determined 
that further cooperation with Switzerland would be dependent on this development.302 The 
EU ensures that it does not intend to complete further deals within areas concerning market 
access, until Switzerland decides to repeal the restriction on the free movement of persons, 
meaning that it cannot ‘cherry-pick’ rules it find preferable for itself, as the free movement of 
persons is a part of a package deal also granting it access to the internal market.303 It is of 
importance, to keep in mind that Switzerland’s case proves that restricting one area affecting 
the internal market also affect other areas connected to the internal market, such as energy 
related matters. Furthermore, there is a wish among the UK’s pro Brexit camp to become an 
independent sovereign state. ‘Euro sceptics’ have been campaigning for a sovereign UK, 
																																																								
299 Eight Reasons Leave Won the UK’s Referendum. BBC News. 2016-06-24 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-eu-referendum-36574526> (Retrieved 2016-09-09). 
300 Although Theresa May states that the UK will be a fully independent and sovereign state, there is a 
probability that the UK’s politicians will aim to negotiate a deal allowing the UK access to the internal market in 
particular areas.  
301 Switzerland to Limit Immigration from all EU States. BBC. 2013-04-25 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-22285886> (Retrieved 2016-10-31).  
302 Swiss Confederation, The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Free Movement of Persons – functioning 
and current state of play. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft. 2016 
<https://www.eda.admin.ch/missions/mission-eu-brussels/en/home/dossiers/personenfreizuegigkeit.html> 
(Retrieved 2016-10-31). 
303Swidlicki, Pawel. Swiss told to vote again on free movement – except this time stakes are higher. Open 
Europe. 2015 <http://openeurope.org.uk/today/blog/swiss-told-to-vote-again-on-free-movement-except-this-
time-the-stakes-are-higher/> (Retrieved 2016-10-31). 
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independent from European legislative framework overriding UK law, for a long time.304 This 
is a delicate balance of the pro-Brexit camp arguments and access to the IEM, and this will be 
discussed below.  
 
8.3. Pro-Brexit Arguments in Contrast to the Existing Models  
Breaking with the EU on energy matters, referred to as the ‘hard’ Brexit, implies per 
definition that there will be no further relations with the EU and therefore the wishes of the 
pro-Brexit camp will be fulfilled. Furthermore also the ‘grey Brexit’ implies that the UK will 
break with the EU on energy matters, however relations with the EU will proceed within 
other areas (e.g. the free movement of persons). For the ‘soft’ Brexit, relations with the EU 
will proceed both on energy matters as well as within other areas (e.g. the free movement of 
persons). For the ‘grey’ and the ‘soft’ Brexit it therefore need to be evaluated whether the 
existing models (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Canada and Albania) fulfil the wishes of the 
pro-Brexit camp.  
 
8.3.1. Free Movement of Persons  
Most EU law applies universally throughout Norway (the EEA) and Switzerland (sectorial 
bilateral agreements), providing most of the conditions of the free movement of persons, 
goods, services and capital that applies to Member States in the EU presented in section 3.2.2 
regarding the internal market. At one extreme the Norwegian Model provides relatively little 
change to status quo, and this existing model would require the UK to adopt the provision on 
the free movement of persons as this is a provision with EEA relevance covered in Article 28 
of the EEA Agreement (together with Annex V of the EEA Agreement on the free movement 
of workers). The Swiss Model also provides for the free movement of persons under Bilateral 
I in the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons.305 
 
Also the Turkish Model and the Canadian Model provides for the free movement of goods 
and to some extent the free movement of services. However, these models would allow the 
UK to restrain the free movement of persons, as this is neither a right nor an obligation under 
the customs union agreement respectively the free trade agreement.306 Furthermore, the 
Albanian Model as a model applied to exemplify the framework applicable for a CS 
participating in the Energy Community, does not provide for the free movement of persons.307  
 																																																								
304 Mason, Rowena. How did UK End Up Voting to Leave the European Union? The Guardian. 2016-06-24 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/how-did-uk-end-up-voting-leave-european-union> 
(Retrieved 2016-10-26). 
305 Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons, June the 21st 1999, 2002 O.J. (L 114) 6 
306 A contrario in the Customs Union Agreement 96/142/EC and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement COM (2016) 470 Final.  
307 This thesis focuses on energy security and Albania is mainly chosen to state an example on a Contracting 
State in the Energy Community. Other relations that Albania has with the EU are irrelevant since it is just the 
relationship in energy related matters that is being analysed in this model (see section 6.7.1). The fact that 
Albania aims for further integration in the internal market, and adopt the provision on the free movement of 
persons, is therefore not relevant for this discussion.  
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The following can be concluded regarding the requirement to adopt the provision on the free 
movement of persons under the existing models.  
 
Existing options Free movement of persons 
The Norwegian Model Yes  
The Swiss Model Yes 
The Turkish Model No 
The Canadian Model No 
The Albanian Model No 
 
Existing options requiring the UK to allow the provision on the free movement of persons, 
such as the Norwegian Model and the Swiss Model, are unattractive post-Brexit as this go 
against the wishes of the pro-Brexit camp to restrain the free movement of persons.  
 
8.3.2. EU Law Overriding National Law  
EU law takes precedence over national law, meaning that EU law is superior to the national 
laws of the Member States of the EU, referred to as the precedence principle. The precedence 
of EU law is confirmed in Article 288 of the TFEU, whereby a regulation shall be binding and 
directly applicable in all Member States. Therefore, Member States of the EU may not apply a 
national law that contradicts to EU law, which was enshrined by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in the Costa versus ENEL Case.308  
 
The wish of the pro-Brexit camp is to become an independent sovereign state. However, most 
of the existing models available for a continued relation between the EU and the UK, results 
in the UK adopting EU law superior to UK law. Within areas where a country allow for the 
application of EU law, the country of concern needs to accept that EU law will take precedent 
over national law in this specific matter.  
 
The following can be concluded regarding EU law overriding national law under the existing 
models.  
 
Existing options EU law overriding national law Areas of concern  
The Norwegian Model Partially Areas covered by the EEA 
Agreement* 
The Swiss Model Partially Areas covered by sectorial 
bilateral agreements** 
The Turkish Model Partially Areas covered by the customs 
union agreement*** 
The Canadian Model No -  
 
The Albanian Model Partially Areas related to the energy 
sector****  
 																																																								
308 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.   
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* The EEA Agreements does not cover the following EU policies: Common Agricultural, Fisheries Policies, 
Customs Union, Common Trade Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Affairs, 
Monetary Union (see section 6.4.2.4). 
** The Sectorial Bilateral Agreements includes the following policies: free movement provisions, trade in 
agricultural products, air transport, land transport, technical trade barriers, public procurement, research 
cooperation, taxation savings, processed agricultural products, statistics and combating fraud, participation in the 
EU’s MEDIA programme and the European Environment Agency, and Swiss financial contributions to 
economic and social cohesion in the new EU Member States (see section 6.4).  
*** The Customs Union Agreement includes the following: free movement of goods and Common Trade Policy. 
However, Turkey indirect adopts EU law, whereby energy law is also included to some extent (see section 
6.5.2).  
**** The Energy Community Treaty includes the following: energy law (see section 6.7).  
 
Accordingly, only the Canadian Model would fulfil the wish among the pro-Brexit camp to 
make the UK an independent sovereign state again. However, the Albanian Model might also 
be an attractive model, as this would only concern the energy sector, compared to the 
Norwegian, the Swiss and the Turkish models with far deeper integration.    
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9. Conclusion   
This thesis is of importance as it is one of the first written comparative studies of potential 
options for Member States withdrawing from the EU. It addresses a question, which is 
currently being reviewed by the UK Government with many specialists trying to identify 
post-Brexit relations. A lot of writing upon this subject has been done in newspapers 
suggesting many post-Brexit relations based on the political climate and gut feelings, however 
this research provides the theoretical and the law aspects of what existing options there 
actually are for the UK within energy security post-Brexit.  
 
The Brexit threatens the UK’s ability to safeguard its supply of gas, as the UK is currently not 
self-sufficient in its gas supply through its domestic gas production and the current legal 
framework providing the UK with measures to safeguard the supply of gas, following the EU, 
will be terminated upon withdrawal. With the UK withdrawing from the EU, there is a need to 
adopt legislation with protection against gas supply shortage: the identified problem in this 
thesis is therefore the need for the UK to safeguard its supply of gas post-withdrawal. The aim 
of this research was to study and compare the legal aspects of the existing options available to 
the UK safeguarding the supply of gas, and these options were divided into two broad 
categories, namely I) options not involving the EU (examined in chapter five) and, II) options 
involving the EU (examined in chapter six). These options were compared upon their function 
to safeguard the supply of gas and from this comparison I came to two conclusions: Firstly, 
the main distinction between the Brexit options is not whether the UK participates in the EU 
or not, but rather whether the UK retain preferential access to the IEM or not, and secondly 
all existing options available for the UK post-withdrawal would provide legislative measures 
safeguarding the supply of gas, with the exception of the self-sufficiency option.  
 
If the UK wants to collaborate with the Member States of the EU to safeguard its supply of 
gas, the UK needs to negotiate a withdrawal agreement allowing the UK to participate in the 
IEM and adopt the regulations thereto (the ‘soft’ Brexit). Through this collaboration the UK 
would take part in the EU’s energy security regime, adopted inter alia, to provide all the 
participating states with a satisfactory legislative framework safeguarding the supply of gas. 
For the UK to retain such preferential access to the IEM, it needs to negotiate to become a 
Member State in the EEA or a CS in the Energy Community. The first relationship is based 
on a bilateral relation concluded as an associated agreement between the EU and its Member 
States on the one hand, and the country of concern, on the other hand, while the latter is based 
on a participation as a CS in the multilateral framework of the Energy Community.  
 
Next to participating in the IEM the UK could, as if it was unsuccessful in negotiating a 
withdrawal agreement with the EU regarding energy related matters (the ‘grey’ Brexit), or if 
the UK withdraw unilaterally (the ‘hard’ Brexit), commit to multilateral trade and energy 
agreements for protection against discriminatory treatment in the gas market. Next to the 
commitment to multilateral agreements, the UK could engage in bilateral energy dialogues 
with supplier countries as well as incentivise gas trade in bilateral supply agreements, for 
example if the supplier country is not part of the multilateral agreement mentioned or if the 
multilateral framework is not providing sufficient security. Also discussed is the self-
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sufficiency option, which provides an insecure future for the UK as it is not possible to 
determine at this point whether new gas fields will be discovered and whether techniques such 
as fracking will cover domestic gas demands in the future.  
 
The UK can because of its particularities such as domestic gas production, interconnectedness 
in the gas market and adequate infrastructure, safeguard its gas supply without participating in 
the EU’s energy security regime. However, following the arguments brought forward in this 
thesis I argue that it is an appealing option for the UK to negotiate a withdrawal agreement 
with the EU allowing for a continued participation in the regional integrated and liberalised 
IEM, implying a ‘soft’ Brexit, since 1) the UK is already physically connected to continental 
Europe and Norway and participation in the IEM allows for preferential access to continental 
Europe and Norway (since Norway is a participant in the IEM as well). Furthermore, it 
appears likely that the energy market arrangements would still need to be harmonised with 
the EU in order to facilitate cross-border trade. This is very similar to the Turkey case, where 
Turkey and the EU had to enforce regulations governing the interconnection between the 
parties, when Turkey was connected to the European electricity grid; 2) a ‘grey’ or a ‘hard’ 
Brexit is not preferred as major gas producing countries are not part of the ECT (e.g. Iran, 
Qatar and Saudi-Arabia) and the WTO has a poor record of lifting trade barriers (even though 
it aims to internationalise trade); 3) a political change (i.e. leaving the IEM) may cause 
fluctuating gas prices in the UK, although market forces mainly drive the price of gas and this 
cannot be predicted with certainty; and 4) the IEM has a higher gas demand than the UK 
alone and the UK will therefore have, as a participant in the IEM, a better position competing 
with other gas consuming giants such as China. 
 
The ‘grey’ and the ‘hard’ Brexit therefore seem less attractive despite the UK’s particularities. 
Although, it seems like the UK would be provided with legislative measures safeguarding the 
supply of gas without the involvement of the EU, retaining access to the IEM would provide 
the smoothest transition for the UK in the energy sector. It must be mentioned though that gas 
is a commodity, which is very sensitive to political instability. Therefore, regardless of 
whether the UK chooses to withdraw unilaterally or negotiate a withdrawal agreement, all 
existing options presented will always impose a potential risk for the UK to safeguard its 
supply of gas, which is clearly highlighted by earlier occurred gas crises.  
 
9.1. Recommendations  
Whether any of the existing options will be possible for the UK to negotiate is beyond the 
academic scope of this thesis, as the negotiation consist of two parties and the intention of the 
EU are not yet known. However, according to the arguments forwarded in the previous 
section, it is preferable for the UK to engage in the regional energy collaboration with the EU 
in order to safeguard its supply of gas post-Brexit. Existing options allowing the UK 
preferential access to the IEM and the adoption of the EU’s energy security regulations are 
the Norwegian Model and the Albanian Model, as well as the Turkish Model to some extent. 
In order for this thesis to be of guidance for the UK Government, the existing options need to 
be placed within the political perspective of Brexit presented in chapter 8, in order to evaluate 
whether they meet the requirements of the pro-Brexit camp.  
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Existing options Type of Brexit regarding 
the energy sector 




EU law overriding 
national law 
The Norwegian Model Soft Yes Yes  Partially 
The Swiss Model Grey No Yes Partially 
The Turkish Model Soft Partially No Partially 
The Canadian Model Grey No No No 
The Albanian Model Soft Yes No Partially 
Bilateral agreement Hard No No No 
Multilateral agreement Hard No No No 
Self-Sufficiency  Hard No No No 
 
The Norwegian Model is unattractive to the UK, as this model requires the UK to adopt the 
vast majority of the EU’s legislation, including the free movement of persons. The Turkish 
Model is fairly unattractive, as it deprives the UK of sovereignty on external trade policy, 
although allowing the UK to restrict the free movement of persons. However, the Albanian 
Model, where the UK applies to become a CS in the Energy Community, neither demands the 
UK to accept the free movement of persons, nor deprive the UK of its sovereignty on external 
trade policy. The Albanian Model is however not flawless, as it would demand the UK to 
accept that EU law takes precedence in energy policy. Although this is against the wishes of 
the pro-Brexit camp, it needs to be highlighted that this is just within energy matters, and that 
this ‘flaw’ is actually one of the strengths of this model, as a regional energy market has 
proven to be successful within safeguarding a participating state’s supply of gas.  
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